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SAM SANDERS
Abstract. In his remarkable paper Formalism 64, Robinson defends his epony-
mous position concerning the foundations of mathematics, as follows:
(i) Any mention of infinite totalities is literally meaningless.
(ii) We should act as if infinite totalities really existed.
Being the originator of Nonstandard Analysis, it stands to reason that Robin-
son would have often been faced with the opposing position that ‘some infinite
totalities are more meaningful than others’, the textbook example being that of
infinitesimals (versus less controversial infinite totalities). For instance, Bishop
and Connes have made such claims regarding infinitesimals, and Nonstandard
Analysis in general, going as far as calling the latter respectively a debasement
of meaning and virtual, while accepting as meaningful other infinite totalities
and the associated mathematical framework.
We shall study the critique of Nonstandard Analysis by Bishop and Connes,
and observe that these authors equate ‘meaning’ and ‘computational content’,
though their interpretations of said content vary. As we will see, Bishop and
Connes claim that the presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in
Nonstandard Analysis yields the absence of meaning (i.e. computational con-
tent). We will debunk the Bishop-Connes critique by establishing the contrary,
namely that the presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Non-
standard Analysis yields the ubiquitous presence of computational content.
In particular, infinitesimals provide an elegant shorthand for expressing com-
putational content. To this end, we introduce a direct translation between a
large class of theorems of Nonstandard Analysis and theorems rich in computa-
tional content (not involving Nonstandard Analysis), similar to the ‘reversals’
from the foundational program Reverse Mathematics. The latter also plays an
important role in gauging the scope of this translation. Abraham Robinson,
formalism, Nonstandard Analysis, computational content
Accepted for publication in Synthese, special issue on the foundations of mathe-
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1. Reverse formalism: What’s in a name?
Implicit in the title of this paper is Robinson’s remarkable paper Formalism 64
([74]) in which he renounces his previous platonist philosophy of mathematics and
outlines his newfound1 formalist beliefs:
(i) Any mention of infinite totalities is literally meaningless.
1 Note that Robinson still held the formalist view nearly ten years after Formalism 64.
Subsequent exchanges, both oral and in published writings, have not induced
me to change my views [from Formalism 64]. Moreover, I believed then and
I still believe that the well-known recent developments in set theory represent
evidence favoring these views. ([75, p. 42])
Moreover, Dauben discusses the origin of Robinson’s ‘change of heart’ in [31, §5].
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(ii) We should act as if infinite totalities really existed.
Most anti-realist positions in the philosophy of mathematics do not go quite as far:
While parts of mathematics are rejected as meaningless -constructivism and the law
of excluded middle are discussed in Section 4.1.1 below- other parts are accepted
as meaningful (usually only after careful justification).
By way of an infamous example of such rejection, Bishop went as far as debasing
Nonstandard Analysis as a debasement of meaning ([13, p. 513]), while Connes
has referred to Nonstandard Analysis as virtual and a chimera ([49, §3.1]). In
particular, for rather different reasons and in different contexts, Bishop and Connes
equate ‘meaningful mathematics’ and ‘mathematics with computational content’,
and therefore claim Nonstandard Analysis is devoid of meaning as it lacks -in their
view- any and all computational content.
As may be expected in light of their different philosophies of mathematics2,
Connes and Bishop have diverging opinions on what constitutes ‘computational
content’, but their motivation for claiming Nonstandard Analysis’ lack thereof is
the same, namely as follows:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the absence of computational content.
We shall refer to this claim as the Bishop-Connes critique (of Nonstandard Anal-
ysis). As discussed in Section 4, Connes has formulated this critique in print more
or less literally, while it is implicit in Bishop’s philosophy of mathematics.
Furthermore, the arguments by Connes and Bishop for this critique have been
dissected in surprising detail in various places and found wanting (as also discussed
in Section 4). Nonetheless, there has been no full-scale debunking of the Bishop-
Connes critique. The aim of this paper precisely is to debunk this critique by
establishing the following ‘opposite’ claim:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the ubiquitous presence of computational content.
In particular, we shall show that infinitesimals provide an elegant shorthand for
expressing computational content. To this end, we establish a direct translation
between (proofs of) theorems of Nonstandard Analysis and (proofs of) theorems
rich in computational content, similar to the ‘reversals’ from the foundational pro-
gram Reverse Mathematics. The latter also plays an important role in gauging the
scope of this translation. Finally, the translation at hand is merely a syntactic ma-
nipulation of finite objects (proofs) given by an algorithm (in the sense of Bishop),
as discussed in Section 6.2.
We label the aforementioned translation as ‘reverse formalism’, as it bestows
Bishop-Connes style meaning, i.e. computational content, onto Nonstandard Anal-
ysis, and is similar to the reversals in Reverse Mathematics (See Section 2). As to
the further structure of this paper, we shall briefly discuss Nonstandard Analysis
in Section 3. The foundational program Reverse Mathematics is introduced in Sec-
tion 2. The views of Bishop and Connes on Nonstandard Analysis are discussed
in Section 4, while the main contribution of this paper, reverse formalism and the
aforementioned translation, is discussed in Section 5.
2See Section 4.1.1 (resp. Section 4.2) for a discussion of Bishop’s (resp. Connes’) philosophy of
mathematics.
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2. Reverse Mathematics
We shall introduce the program Reverse Mathematics, sketch its main results,
and discuss the associated vague notion of ‘mathematical theorem’. As we will see,
the classification provided by Reverse Mathematics is quite elegant but inherently
vague. In particularly, there is no meta-theorem or formula class capturing this
classification. Our results in Section 5 are based on Reverse Mathematics in the
sense that we obtain a similar classification and that our classification is similarly
inherently vague. In our opinion, a lot of philosophical insight into mathematics
can be reaped from the study of these vague aspects of the discipline, but that is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
2.1. Introducing Reverse Mathematics. Reverse Mathematics (RM) is a pro-
gram in the foundations of mathematics initiated around 1975 by Friedman ([39,40])
and developed extensively by Simpson ([82, 84]) and others. The aim of RM is to
find the axioms necessary to prove a statement of ordinary mathematics, i.e. dealing
with countable or separable objects. Simpson neatly summarises the main results:
In many cases, if a mathematical theorem is proved from appropri-
ately weak set existence axioms, then the axioms will be logically
equivalent to the theorem. Furthermore, only a few specific set
existence axioms arise repeatedly in this context, which in turn
correspond to classical foundational programs. This is the theme
of reverse mathematics, [. . . ] ([84, Preface to the second edition]).
We now discuss these results in more detail while referring to Simpson’s monograph
[84] for full details like the exact definitions of the formal systems used.
First of all, the classical3 base theory RCA0 of ‘computable
4 mathematics’ is
usually assumed to be given in RM. Thus, the aim of RM is as follows:
The aim of RM is to find the minimal axioms A such that RCA0
proves [A→ T ] for statements T of ordinary mathematics.
Surprisingly, once the minimal axioms A have been found, we almost always also
have RCA0 ⊢ [A↔ T ], i.e. not only can we derive the theorem T from the axioms
A (the ‘usual’ way of doing mathematics), we can also derive the axiom A from the
theorem T (the ‘reverse’ way of doing mathematics). In light of the latter, the field
was baptised ‘Reverse Mathematics’.
Secondly, and perhaps even more surprisingly, in the majority5 of cases for a
statement T of ordinary mathematics, either T is provable in RCA0, or the lat-
ter proves T ↔ Ai, where Ai is one of the logical systems WKL0,ACA0, ATR0 or
Π11-CA0. The latter together with RCA0 form the ‘Big Five’ and the aforemen-
tioned observation that most mathematical theorems fall into one of the Big Five
categories, is called the Big Five phenomenon ([63, p. 432]). Furthermore, each of
the Big Five has a natural formulation in terms of (Turing) computability (See e.g.
[84, I.3.4, I.5.4, I.7.5]). As noted by Simpson in [84, I.12], each of the Big Five also
corresponds (sometimes loosely) to a foundational program in mathematics.
3In Constructive Reverse Mathematics ([48]), intuitionistic logic is used instead.
4RCA0 consists of induction IΣ1, and the recursive comprehension axiom ∆01-CA.
5Exceptions are classified in the so-called Reverse Mathematics Zoo ([37]). Most of these are
‘combinatorial in nature’, another vague notion.
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2.2. Ordinary mathematics and other vague notions. A crucial point re-
garding RM is that the two main results from Section 2.1 (namely ‘reversals’ and
the ‘Big Five phenomenon’) are heuristic and qualitative observations following
the empirical study of theorems of ordinary mathematics. Obviously, the category
‘ordinary mathematics’ is vague, but is described by Simpson as well as can be
expected, namely as follows:
We identify as ordinary or non-set-theoretic that body of math-
ematics which is prior to or independent of the introduction of
abstract set-theoretic concepts. We have in mind such branches as
geometry, number theory, calculus, differential equations, real and
complex analysis, countable algebra, the topology of complete sepa-
rable metric spaces, mathematical logic, and computability theory.
(Emphasis in original, [84, p. 1])
However, the vagueness in the above main results of RM runs much deeper: Since
‘ordinary mathematics’ does not have a formal definition, how should we then
understand the notion ‘theorem of ordinary mathematics’? In particular, when
and why does one bestow the title ‘theorem’ onto an arbitrary sentence provable in
second-order arithmetic?
While we do not claim to answer this question, the notion ‘theorem of ordi-
nary mathematics’ can be elucidated as follows: When formalising mathematics
in second-order arithmetic Z2 as in RM, it becomes apparent that only a small
fragment of the Z2 is needed. In particular, the strongest Big Five system Π
1
1-CA0
suffices for formalising almost all of ordinary mathematics, while this system is
only the ‘first fragment’ of Z2 = ∪kΠ
1
k-CA0. Furthermore, the Big Five systems of
RM were initially formulated with the axiom schema of induction for any formula
([39, p. 236]), but it was soon realised that induction is only needed for purely ex-
istential formulas. The subscript ‘0’ in the Big Five systems refers to this use of
restricted induction.
Hence, we observe that large parts of the induction and comprehension axioms
in Z2 are not needed for formalising the known results of ordinary mathematics
(the latter as described in the above quote by Simpson). It is a natural first step to
identify these ‘unneeded’ axioms as ‘non-mathematical’. While this falls short of
providing a formal definition for ‘theorem of ordinary mathematics’, we believe that
it is essential to make a distinction between sentences of second-order arithmetic
which are ‘mathematical’ and which are ‘non-mathematical’ in nature. The exact
distinction between these two concepts is inherently vague, but it is a ‘real’ dis-
tinction, as evidenced by the aforementioned existence of ‘unneeded’ axioms which
make up the bulk of Z2.
So far, we have left unanswered the question of when and why one bestows
the title ‘theorem’ onto an arbitrary sentence provable in second-order arithmetic.
We have observed that some sentences of second-order arithmetic may be called
‘non-mathematical’ in the sense that they are not needed in the formalisation of
mathematics in Z2. Thus, we have established some evidence for the reality of
the distinction ‘mathematical versus non-mathematical sentence’ in second-order
arithmetic. The notion of ‘theorem of ordinary mathematics’ has therewith become
slightly more real.
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Finally, the above observations are not limited to RM alone: There are at least
two other fields where a similar ‘mathematical versus non-mathematical’ distinction
is made. Firstly, Bishop makes a clear distinction between ‘real mathematics’ and
formal systems in the following quotes from [9, p. 6].
A bugaboo of both Brouwer and the logicians has been compulsive
speculation about the nature of the continuum. In the case of the
logicians this leads to contortions in which various formal systems,
all detached from reality, are interpreted within one another in the
hope that the nature of the continuum will somehow emerge.
In fairness to Brouwer it should be said that he did not associate
himself with these efforts to formalize reality; it is the fault of the
logicians that many mathematicians who think they know some-
thing of the constructive point of view have in mind a dinky formal
system or, just as bad, confuse constructivism with recursive func-
tion theory.
It should be noted that Bishop revised his views on the value of formal systems
later in life (See e.g. [14, p. 60]), as also discussed in Section 6.2.
Secondly, ever since Go¨del’s famous incompleteness theorems (See e.g. [23, II]), it
is known that a reasonably rich and consistent logical system cannot prove its own
consistency. For many years, it was then an open problem to find mathematically
natural examples of statements not provable in e.g. Peano arithmetic. Paris and
Harrington succeeded in finding such a statement, as suggested by the quote:
We investigate a reasonably natural theorem of finitary combina-
torics, a simple extension of the Finite Ramsey Theorem. This
chapter is mainly devoted to demonstrating that this theorem,
while true, is not provable in Peano arithmetic. ([3, p. 1134])
The above examples suggest that the ‘mathematical versus non-mathematical’ dis-
tinction is real at least in the sense of being commonplace to people working in
mathematical logic. As noted above, a lot of philosophical insight into mathe-
matics can be reaped -in our opinion- from the study of these vague aspects of
mathematical logic, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Nonstandard Analysis
We introduce Nelson’s internal set theory IST, a well-known axiomatic approach
to Nonstandard Analysis first introduced in [64]. An introduction to the practice
of IST may be found in [71]. We discuss certain important fragments of IST from
[6] in Section 3.2.
3.1. Nelson’s axiomatic approach to Nonstandard Analysis. In Nelson’s
syntactic (or ‘axiomatic’) approach to Nonstandard Analysis ([64]), as opposed to
Robinson’s semantic one ([72]), a new predicate ‘st(x)’, read as ‘x is standard’ is
added to the language of ZFC, the usual foundation of mathematics6. The notations
(∀stx) and (∃sty) are short for (∀x)(st(x) → . . . ) and (∃y)(st(y) ∧ . . . ). A formula
is called internal if it does not involve ‘st’, and external otherwise. The external
6The acronym ZFC stands for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice; see [46]
for an introduction to set theory.
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axioms Idealisation, Standardization, and Transfer govern the new predicate ‘st’;
They are respectively defined7 as:
(I) (∀st finx)(∃y)(∀z ∈ x)ϕ(z, y) → (∃y)(∀stx)ϕ(x, y), for internal ϕ with any
(possibly nonstandard) parameters.
(S) (∀stx)(∃sty)(∀stz)
(
(z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z))↔ z ∈ y
)
, for any ϕ.
(T) (∀stt)
[
(∀stx)ϕ(x, t) → (∀x)ϕ(x, t)
]
, where ϕ(x, t) is internal, and only has
free variables t, x.
The system IST is the internal system ZFC extended with the aforementioned exter-
nal axioms; The former is a conservative extension of ZFC for the internal language
([64, §8]). It goes without saying that the above extension may be done for a large
spectrum of logical systems other than ZFC. In Section 3.2, we study this exten-
sion of the usual axiomatisation of arithmetic, called Peano Arithmetic. As noted
by Nelson, we can think of the standard sets of IST as those sets of mainstream
mathematics.
Every specific object of conventional mathematics is a standard set.
It remains unchanged in the new theory [IST]. ([64, p. 1166])
We shall use ‘mainstream’ and ‘standard’ mathematics interchangeably in the con-
text of IST. Finally, we discuss the intuitive meaning of the external axioms.
First of all, the contraposition of I implies that for all internal ϕ:
(3.1) (∀y)(∃stx)ϕ(x, y)→ (∃st finx)(∀y)(∃z ∈ x)ϕ(z, y),
where the underlined part is internal. Hence, intuitively speaking, Idealisation al-
lows us to ‘pull a standard quantifiers like (∃stx) in (3.1) through a normal quantifier
(∀y)’. Note that the axioms BΣn of Peano arithmetic ([23, II]) play a similar role:
The former allow one to ‘pull an unbounded number quantifier through a bounded
number quantifier’. In each case, one obtains a formula in a kind of ‘normal form’
with a block of certain quantifiers (resp. external/unbounded) up front followed by
another block of different quantifiers (resp. internal/bounded). The following ex-
ample involving nonstandard continuity in IST is illustrative (See [64, §5] for more
examples).
Remark 3.1. We say that f is nonstandard continuous on the set X ⊆ R if
(3.2) (∀stx ∈ X)(∀y ∈ X)(x ≈ y → f(x) ≈ f(y)),
where z ≈ w is (∀stn ∈ N)(|z − w| < 1
n
). Resolving ‘≈’ in (3.2), we obtain
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀y ∈ X)
(
(∀stN ∈ N)(|x− y| < 1
N
)→ (∀stk ∈ N)(|f(x) − f(y)| < 1
k
)
)
.
Using classical logic, we may bring out the ‘(∀stk ∈ N)’ and (∀stN ∈ N) quantifiers
as follows:
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀stk ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)(∃stN ∈ N)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x) − f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
Applying I as in (3.1) to the underlined formula, we obtain a finite and standard
set z ⊂ N such that (∀y ∈ X)(∃N ∈ z) in the previous formula. Now let N0 be the
maximum of all numbers in z, and note that for N = N0
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀stk ∈ N)(∃stN ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x) − f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
7The superscript ‘fin’ in (I) means that x is finite, i.e. its number of elements are bounded by
a natural number.
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The previous formula has all standard quantifiers up front and is very close to the
‘epsilon-delta’ definition of continuity from mainstream mathematics. Hence, we
observe the role of I: to connect the worlds of nonstandard mathematics (as in (3.2))
and mainstream mathematics.
Secondly, the axiom Transfer expresses that certain statements about standard
objects are also true for all objects. This property is essential in proving the equiva-
lence between so-called epsilon-delta statements and their nonstandard formulation.
The following example involving continuity is illustrative.
Example 3.2. Recall Example 3.1, the definition of nonstandard continuity (3.2)
and the final equation in particular. The latter yields the following by dropping
the ‘st’ for N :
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀stk ∈ N)(∃N ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
Assuming X and f to be standard, we can apply T to the previous to obtain
(3.3) (∀x ∈ X)(∀k ∈ N)(∃N ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
Note that (3.3) is just the usual epsilon-delta definition of continuity. In turn, to
prove that (3.3) implies nonstandard continuity as in (3.2), fix standard X, f, k
in (3.3) and apply the contraposition of T to ‘(∃N ∈ N)ϕ(N)’ where ϕ is the
underlined formula in (3.3). The resulting formula (∃stN ∈ N)ϕ(N) immediately
implies nonstandard continuity as in (3.2).
By the previous example, nonstandard continuity (3.2) and epsilon delta con-
tinuity (3.3) are equivalent for standard functions in IST. However, the former
involves far less quantifier alternations and is close to the intuitive understanding
of continuity as ‘no jumps in the graph of the function’. Hence, we observe the
role of T: to connect the worlds of nonstandard mathematics (as in (3.2)) and
mainstream mathematics (as in (3.3)).
Thirdly, Standardization (also called Standard Part) is useful as follows: It is
in general easy to build nonstandard and approximate solutions to mathematical
problems in IST, but a standard solution is needed as the latter also exists in
‘normal’ mathematics (as it is suitable for Transfer). Intuitively, the axiom S tells
us that from a nonstandard approximate solution, we can always find a standard
one. Since we may apply Transfer to formulas involving the latter, we can then
also prove the latter is an object of normal mathematics. The following example is
highly illustrative.
Example 3.3. The intermediate value theorem states that for every continuous
function f : [0, 1] → R such that f(0)f(1) < 0, there is x ∈ [0, 1] such that
f(x) = 0. Assuming f is standard, it is easy8 to find a nonstandard real y in the
unit interval such that f(y) ≈ 0, i.e. y is an intermediate value ‘up to infinitesimals’.
The axiom S then tells9 us that there is a standard real x such that x ≈ y, and by
8By Example 3.1, we may assume f is nonstandard continuous. Let N be a nonstandard
natural number and let j ≤ N be the least number such that f( j
N
)f( j+1
N
) ≤ 0. Then f(j/N) ≈ 0
by nonstandard continuity, and we are done.
9Let y ∈ [0, 1] be such that f(y) ≈ 0 and consider the set of rationals z = {q1, q1, q2, . . . , qN}
where qi is a rational such that |y− qi| <
1
i
and qi =
j
2i
for some j ≤ 2i, and N is a nonstandard
number. Applying S, there is a standard set w such that (∀sti)(qi ∈ w). The standard sequence
qi converges to a standard real x ≈ y.
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the nonstandard continuity of f (See previous example), we have f(x) ≈ 0. Now
apply T to the latter10 to obtain f(x) = 0. Hence, we have obtain the (internal)
intermediate value theorem for standard functions, and T yields the full theorem.
Hence, we observe the role of S: to connect the worlds of nonstandard mathemat-
ics and mainstream (standard) mathematics by providing standard objects ‘close
to’ nonstandard ones.
In conclusion, the external axioms of IST provide a connection between nonstan-
dard and mainstream mathematics: They allow one to ‘jump back and forth’ be-
tween the standard and nonstandard world. This technique is useful as some prob-
lems (like switching limits and integrals) may be easier to solve in the discrete/finite
world of nonstandard mathematics than in the continuous/infinite world of stan-
dard mathematics (or vice versa). This observation lies at the heart of Nonstandard
Analysis and is a first step towards understanding its power.
3.2. Fragments of Nelson’s internal set theory. Fragments of IST have been
studied before and we are interested in the systems P and H introduced in [6]. In a
nutshell, P and H are versions of IST based on the usual classical and intuitionistic
axiomatisations of arithmetic, namely Peano and Heyting arithmetic. We refer
to [54] for the exact definitions of our version of Peano and Heyting arithmetic,
commonly abbreviated respectively as E-PAω and E-HAω. In particular, the systems
P and H are conservative11 extensions of Peano arithmetic E-PAω and Heyting
arithmetic E-HAω, as also follows from Theorem 3.4. We discuss the systems P and
H in detail in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, and list them in full detail in Section A. We
discuss the reason why P and H are important to our enterprise in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1. The classical system P. We discuss the fragment P of IST from [6]. Similar
to the way IST is an extension of ZFC, P is just the internal system E-PAω with the
language extended with a new standardness predicate ‘st’ and with some special
cases of the external axioms of IST. The technical details of this extension may be
found in Section A while we now provide an intuitive motivation for the external
axioms of P, assuming basic familiarity with the finite type system of Go¨del’s system
T (also discussed in Section A).
First of all, the system P does not include any fragment of Transfer. The mo-
tivation for this omission is as follows: The system ACA0 proves the existence of
the non-computable Turing jump ([84, III]) and very weak fragments of T already
imply versions of ACA0. In particular, the following axiom is the Transfer axiom
limited to universal number quantifiers.
(Π01-TRANS) (∀
stf1)
[
(∀stn0)f(n) 6= 0→ (∀m)f(m) 6= 0
]
.
As proved in [78, §4.1], the system P + Π01-TRANS proves the existence of the
Turing jump, which is also implicit in the appendix to [38]. Thus, due to its non-
constructive nature, no Transfer is present in P.
Secondly, the system P involves the full axiom Idealisation in the language of P
as follows: For any internal formula in the language of P:
(3.4) (∀stxσ
∗
)(∃yτ )(∀zσ ∈ x)ϕ(z, y)→ (∃yτ )(∀stxσ)ϕ(x, y),
10Recall that ‘f(x) ≈ 0’ is short for (∀stk)(|f(x)| < 1
k
).
11Like for ZFC and IST, if the system P (resp. H) proves an internal sentence, then this sentence
is provable in E-PAω (resp. E-HAω).
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As it turns out, the axiom I does not yield any ‘non-computable’ consequences,
which also follows from Theorem 3.4.
Thirdly, the system P involves a weakening of Standardisation. In particular,
the axiom S may be equivalently formulated as follows:
(S) (∀stx)(∃sty)Φ(x, y)→
(
∃stF
)
(∀stx)Φ(x, F (x)),
for any formula Φ in the language IST. In this way, S may be viewed as a ‘standard’
version of the axiom of choice. In light of the possible non-constructive content of
the latter (See Footnote 16), it is no surprise that S has to be weakened. In
particular, P includes the following version of S, called the Herbrandised Axiom of
Choice, which is defined as follows:
(HACint) (∀
stxρ)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y)→
(
∃stGρ→τ
∗)
(∀stxρ)(∃yτ ∈ G(x))ϕ(x, y),
where ϕ is any internal function in the language of P. Note that G does not output
a witness for y, but a finite list of potential witnesses to y. This is quite similar to
Herbrand’s theorem ([23, I.2.5]), hence the name of HACint.
Finally, we list two basic but important axioms of P from Definition A.3 below.
These axioms are inspired by Nelson’s claim about IST as follows:
Every specific object of conventional mathematics is a standard set.
It remains unchanged in the new theory [IST]. ([64, p. 1166])
Specific objects of the system P obviously include the constants 0, 1,×,+, and
anything built from those. Thus, the system P includes the following two axioms;
we refer to Definition A.3 for the exact technical details.
(1) All constants in the language of E-PAω are standard.
(2) A standard functional applied to a standard input yields a standard output.
As a result, the system P proves that any term of E-PAω is standard. This will turn
out to be essential in Section 5.
3.2.2. The constructive system H. We discuss the fragment H of IST from [6]. Sim-
ilar to the way IST is an extension of ZFC, H is just the internal system E-HAω with
the language extended with a new standardness predicate ‘st’ and with some special
cases of the external axioms of IST. The technical details of this extension may be
found in Section A; we now provide an intuitive motivation for the external axioms
of H, assuming basic familiarity with the finite type system of Go¨del’s system T
(also discussed in Section A). Note that E-HAω is based on intuitionistic logic as
introduced in Section 4.1.1.
First of all, the system H does not involve Transfer for the same reasons P does
not. By contrast the axioms HACint and (3.4) (and its contraposition) are included
in H, with the restrictions on ϕ lifted even.
Secondly, the system H includes some ‘non-constructive’ axioms relativized to
‘st’. We just mention the names of these axioms and refer to Section A for a
full description. The system H involves nonstandard versions of the following ax-
ioms: Markov’s pricinciple (See e.g. [4, p. 47]) and the independence of premises
principle (See e.g. [54, §5]). Nonetheless, the system H proves the same internal
sentence as E-HAω by Theorem 3.4, i.e. the nonstandard versions are not really
non-constructive.
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Finally, H also includes the basic axioms from Definition A.3 as listed at the end
of Section 3.2.1 above.
3.2.3. The importance of P and H. We discuss why H and P are important to our
enterprise. In a nutshell, these systems allow one to obtain computational content
from Nonstandard Analysis by the following12 ‘term extraction’ theorem. The scope
of this theorem includes a huge part of Nonstandard Analysis as discussed in Section
5.5.
Theorem 3.4 (Term extraction). Let ϕ be internal, i.e. not involving ‘st’.
If P (resp. H) proves (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y), then we can extract a term t from this
proof such that E-PAω (resp. E-HAω) proves (∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ϕ(x, y). The term t is
such that t(x) is a finite list.
Note that the conclusion of the theorem, namely ‘E-PAω proves (∀x)(∃y ∈
t(x))ϕ(x, y)’, does not involve Nonstandard Analysis. The term t from the previous
theorem is essentially a computer program formulated in e.g. Martin-Lo¨f type the-
ory or Agda ([56,95]). As such, t is definitely an ‘algorithm’ in the sense of Bishop
(See Section 4.1.1).
As a first example of the ubiquity of computational content in Nonstandard
Analysis, we now consider an elementary application of Theorem 3.4 to nonstandard
continuity as in Example 3.1. More examples may be found in Section 5 and [78].
Example 3.5 (Nonstandard and constructive continuity). Suppose f is a function
defined on the reals which is nonstandard continuous, provable in P. In other words,
similar to Example 3.1, the following is provable in P:
(3.5) (∀stx ∈ R)(∀y ∈ R)(x ≈ y → f(x) ≈ f(y)).
Since P includes Idealisation (essentially) as in IST, P also proves the following:
(∀stx ∈ R)(∀stk ∈ N)(∃stN ∈ N)(3.6)
(∀y ∈ R)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x) − f(y)| < 1
k
)
,
in exactly the same way as proved in Example 3.1. Since the underlined formula
in (3.6) is internal, we note that Theorem 3.4 applies to ‘P ⊢ (3.6)’. Applying the
latter theorem, we obtain a term t(1×0)→0
∗
such that E-PAω proves:
(∀x ∈ R, k ∈ N)(∃N ∈ t(x, k))(∀y ∈ R)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
Since t(x, k) is a finite list of natural numbers, define s(x, k) as the maximum of
t(x, k)(i) for i < |t(x, k)| where |t(x, k)| is the length of the finite list t(x, k). The
term s is called a modulus of continuity of f as it satisfies:
(∀x ∈ R, k ∈ N)(∀y ∈ R)
(
|x− y| < 1
s(x,k) → |f(x)− f(y)| <
1
k
)
.
Similarly, from the proof in P that f is nonstandard uniformly continuous, we
may extract a modulus of uniform continuity (See Section 5.3). This observation is
important : moduli are an essential part of Bishop’s Constructive Analysis from Sec-
tion 4.1.1 (See e.g. [9, p. 34]), so we just proved that such constructive information
is implicit in the nonstandard notion of continuity!
12The full version of Theorem 3.4 is Corollary A.6 in Section A.
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By the previous example, the nonstandard notion of (uniform) continuity con-
tains non-trivial constructive information. It is a natural question how far this
goes, i.e. how large is the scope of Theorem 3.4? As it turns out, the scope of the
latter is huge, as we discuss in Section 5.5 below. In a nutshell, other nonstandard
definitions (of integration, differentiability, compactness, convergence, et cetera)
behave in exactly the same way as continuity in Example 3.5, and the same holds
for theorems solely formulated with these nonstandard definitions.
3.3. Constructive Nonstandard Analysis. While most of this paper deals with
classical Nonstandard Analysis, we now discuss constructive Nonstandard Analysis
as its insights will be needed below. Note that constructive mathematics (in the
sense of Bishop) is introduced in Section 4.1.1. We already have the system H as
an example of the syntactic approach to constructive Nonstandard Analysis, and
we now discuss the semantic approach.
Intuitively, the semantic approach to Nonstandard Analysis pioneered by Robin-
son ([72]) consists in somehow building a nonstandard model of a given structure
(say the set of real numbers R) and proving that the original structure is a strict
subset of the nonstandard model (usually called the set of hyperreal numbers ∗R)
while establishing properties similar to Transfer, Idealisation and Standardisation
as theorems of this model and the original structure. Historically, Nelson of course
studied Robinson’s work and axiomatised the semantic approach in his internal set
theory IST. The most common way of building a suitable nonstandard model is
using a free ultrafilter (See e.g. [47, 93]). The existence of the latter is a rather
strong non-constructive assumption.
As it turns out, building nonstandard models with nice properties like Transfer
can also be done constructively: Palmgren in [66, Section 2] and [65] constructs a
nonstandard modelM (also called a ‘sheaf’ model) satisfying the Extended Transfer
Principle by [66, Corollary 4 and Theorem 5]. As noted by Palmgren ([66, p.
235]), the construction of M can be formalised in Martin-Lo¨f’s constructive type
theory ([56]). The latter was developed independently of Bishop’s constructive
mathematics (See Section 4.1.1), but can be viewed as a foundation of the latter.
4. The Bishop-Connes critique
We discuss the critique of Nonstandard Analysis by Errett Bishop (Section 4.1)
and Alain Connes (Section 4.2). This critique can be summarised as follows:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the absence of computational content.
and will be called the Bishop-Connes critique (of Nonstandard Analysis). As may
be expected in light of their different philosophies of mathematics13, Connes and
Bishop have diverging opinions on what constitutes ‘computational content’, while
they also have different areas in mind: Bishop wrote on the foundations of mathe-
matics while Connes had applications to physics in mind. Furthermore, the argu-
ments for this critique by Bishop and Connes have been studied and found wanting,
as discussed below. Nonetheless, this critique was never fully refuted, and we un-
dertake this task in Section 5.
13See Section 4.1.1 (resp. Section 4.2) for a discussion of Bishop’s (resp. Connes’) philosophy
of mathematics.
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4.1. Bishop’s critique of Nonstandard Analysis. Before we can discuss Bishop’s
critique of Nonstandard Analysis, we need to study his philosophy of mathematics
in Section 4.1.1.
4.1.1. Bishop’s philosophy of mathematics. There can be little doubt about the
philosophical position of Bishop in light of his monograph Foundations of Construc-
tive Analysis ([9]), in which the first chapter is titled A constructivist manifesto and
the preface reads:
This book is a piece of constructivist propaganda, designed to show
that there does exist a satisfactory alternative [to classical mathe-
matics]. To this end we develop a large portion of abstract analysis
within a constructive framework. ([9, p. ix])
Our program is simple: To give numerical meaning to as much as
possible of classical abstract analysis. Our motivation is the well-
known scandal, exposed by Brouwer (and others) in great detail,
that classical mathematics is deficient in numerical meaning. ([9, p.
ix])
Bishop thus subscribes to constructivism, a position which distinguishes itself from
mainstream14 (or ‘classical’) mathematics by the insistence that a mathematical
object only exists once it has been constructed (in some way).
For instance, constructivists generally reject proof by contradiction as this proof
technique concludes15 the existence of an object without constructing it. More
generally, the law of excluded middle B∨¬B (LEM for short) and axioms implying
it16 are rejected in constructivism due to the lack of constructive content of LEM.
This rejection becomes more palatable upon observing the interpretation of the
logical symbols in constructivism, referred to as the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov
(BHK for short) interpretation (See [15, §1]).
Definition 4.1 (BHK-interpretation).
(1) The disjunction P ∨Q: we have an algorithm that outputs either P or Q,
together with a proof of the chosen disjunct.
(2) The conjunction P ∧Q: we have both a proof of P and a proof of Q.
(3) The implication P → Q: by means of an algorithm we can convert any
proof of P into a proof of Q.
(4) The negation ¬P : assuming P , we can derive a contradiction (such as
0 = 1); equivalently, we can prove P → (0 = 1).
(5) The formula (∃x)P (x): we have (i) an algorithm that computes a certain
object x, and (ii) an algorithm that, using the information supplied by the
application of algorithm (i), demonstrates that P (x) holds.
(6) The formula (∀x ∈ A)P (x): we have an algorithm that, applied to an object
x and a proof that x ∈ A, demonstrates that P (x) holds.
14Note that outside of the context of IST, ‘mainstream’ mathematics just has its usual meaning
in this paper.
15To prove that (∃x)A(x) by contradiction in classical mathematics, one assumes (∀x)¬A(x)
and derives a contradiction, i.e. one shows that ¬[(∀x)¬A(x)]. Using the law of excluded middle
B ∨ ¬B, one then concludes that (∃x)A(x)
16The axiom of choice implies LEM under certain conditions ([34]), but fragments of the axiom
of choice are considered acceptable in constructive mathematics (See [21, §1.4]).
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In light of the first item, the law of excluded middle LEM states the existence of
an algorithm which can decide whether a given mathematical theorem is provable
or not. Since nobody believes such an algorithm will ever be found, the rejection
of LEM given the BHK interpretation becomes clear.
What is interesting about Bishop’s version of constructive mathematics, is its
‘neutral’ position, which we discuss in more detail. Now, there are a number of ap-
proaches to constructive mathematics, as discussed at length in e.g. [4, III], [89, I.4],
or [19], and Bishop’s variety, called ‘BISH’, can be said to occupy a ‘neutral’ posi-
tion between some of these and classical mathematics. In particular, any theorem
of BISH is also a theorem of classical mathematics, a theorem of Brouwer’s intu-
itionistic mathematics17, and a theorem in the Russian school of recursive18 math-
ematics, while the latter two are inconsistent with one another and with classical
mathematics.
This neutral position comes at a price though: To guarantee the aforementioned
compatibility of BISH with classical, intuitionistic, and Russian recursive mathe-
matics, the notion of ‘algorithm’ is left unspecified by Bishop, despite its central
role in light of the BHK-interpretation. The following quote by Bridges captures
the previous nicely.
Although Bishop has been criticised for being too vague in his con-
cept of algorithm, by this very vagueness he left open the possibility
of interpreting his work within a variety of formal systems. Not only
is every theorem of BISH also a theorem of recursive constructive
mathematics - which is, roughly, recursive function theory devel-
oped with intuitionistic logic - but it is also a theorem of Brouwer’s
intuitionistic mathematics, and, perhaps more significantly, of clas-
sical mathematics. ([20, p. 2])
Note that in this paper we do not judge this design choice made by Bishop: We
merely point out a central aspect of BISH, namely a ‘know-it-when-you-see-it’ ap-
proach to the notion of algorithm resulting in a ‘informal but rigorous’ style.
Finally, we wish to point out that while Bishop was critical of classical mathe-
matics, the main point of his constructivist enterprise was not this criticism, but
to build a ‘computationally rich’ alternative to classical mathematics. We consider
two telling examples.
First of all, according to Bishop, while classical (or ‘idealistic’) mathematics lacks
computational content, it is not necessarily ‘worthless’:
. . . idealistic mathematics is [not] worthless from the constructive
point of view. This would be as silly as contending that unrigorous
mathematics is worthless from the classical point of view. Every
theorem proved with idealistic methods presents a challenge: to find
a constructive version, and to give it a constructive proof. ([9, p.
x])
17Brouwer’s intuitionism is discussed at length by Dummett in [36], including Brouwer’s the-
orem that all total functions on the unit interval must be (uniformly) continuous ([36, Theorem
3.19]), which contradicts classical mathematics.
18The name ‘recursive’ mathematics betrays that all mathematical objects must be recursive
(called ‘computable’ nowadays), as captured in the axiom Church’s Thesis (See [19, Chapter 3]
or [4, I.8] for details), which contradicts classical mathematics.
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Note that we do not claim that the ‘constructivisation’ of classical mathematics is
the only goal of Bishop or his followers (See [14, p. 54] for a discussion).
Secondly, while Bishop is clear about his nominalist reservations regarding clas-
sical mathematics (going as far as comparing the latter to ‘God’s mathematics’ in
[9, §1]), he does not have skeptical doubts about e.g. basic arithmetic (based on
intuitionistic logic obviously). For instance, he takes for granted the set of natural
numbers and the associated axiom of induction.
The positive integers and their arithmetic are presupposed by the
very nature of our intelligence and, we are tempted to believe, by
the very nature of intelligence in general. The development of the
theory of the positive integers from the primitive concept of the
unit, the concept of adjoining a unit, and the process of mathemat-
ical induction carries complete conviction. ([9, §1.1])
Furthermore, Bishop has no problems accepting much more complicated mathe-
matical objects (as is clear from the below quote), as long as these have been built
using (and can in principle be reduced to) algorithmic reasoning.
Building on the positive integers, weaving a web of ever more sets
and more functions, we get the basic structures of mathematics:
the rational number system, the real number system, the euclidean
spaces, the complex number system, the algebraic number fields,
Hilbert space, the classical groups, and so forth. Within the frame-
work of these structures most mathematics is done. Everything
attaches itself to number, and every mathematical statement ul-
timately expresses the fact that if we perform certain computa-
tions within the set of positive integers, we shall get certain results.
([9, §1.1])
We summarise that Bishop judged classical mathematics to be deficient in compu-
tational content, and that he took it upon himself to develop a kind of mathematics
which is compatible with both classical and constructive approaches to mathematics
and in which computational content is central. In a nutshell, Bishop equates mean-
ing with computational content, i.e. meaningful mathematics with mathematics as
developed in BISH where every statement has numerical meaning and every object
has an algorithmic description. Finally, we are by no means the first to make this
observation: the assertion that Bishop equates meaning and computational content
is discussed in detail in [51, §6.2].
4.1.2. An alternative view of constructive mathematics. We described Bishop’s phi-
losophy of mathematics in the previous section. We now present an alternative view
of constructive mathematics first formulated by Richman ([69,70]). The basic ques-
tion we are considering is as follows:
What is the nature of objects in Bishop’s Constructive Analysis?
As is clear from the previous section, Bishop describes his mathematics as dealing
with objects which are ‘given by an algorithm’, as explicitly stated in e.g. [21, p.
14] and [12, p. 15], but the notion of algorithm is not defined. We also saw that
Bishop had good motivations for leaving the notion of algorithm undefined. We
now discuss another view of constructive mathematics which sidesteps the previous
REVERSE FORMALISM 16 15
question by placing the underlying (intuitionistic) logic at the forefront, while the
constructive ontology ‘everything is given by algorithms’ is de-emphasised.
In a nutshell, experience bears out that Bishop’s Constructive Analysis simply
amounts tomathematics using intuitionistic logic in practice, i.e. the above question
and the nature of Bishop’s notion of algorithm can be sidestepped. Bridges and
Palmgren nicely formulate this as follows.
However, this criticism [that Bishop left the notion of algorithm
undefined] can be overcome by looking more closely at what practi-
tioners of BISH actually do, as distinct from what Bishop may have
thought he was doing, when they prove theorems: in practice, they
are doing mathematics with intuitionistic logic. Experience shows
that the restriction to intuitionistic logic always forces mathemati-
cians to work in a manner that, at least informally, can be described
as algorithmic; so algorithmic mathematics appears to be equiva-
lent to mathematics that uses only intuitionistic logic. If that is
the case, then we can practice constructive mathematics using in-
tuitionistic logic on any reasonably defined mathematical objects,
not just some class of “constructive objects”. ([17, §3.3]; quotes in
the original)
Obviously, the above emphasis on logic is at odds with the primacy of mathematics
over logic that was part of the philosophy of Brouwer, Heyting, Markov, Bishop,
and other pioneers of constructivism. On the other hand, as stated by Bridges in
[17, §3.3], this emphasis does capture the essence of constructive mathematics in
practice.
4.1.3. Bishop on Nonstandard Analysis. Bishop’s constructivist convictions have
been made clear, as well as the intentions of his program for the redevelopment of
mathematics based on computational content. Despite this predominant ‘positive’
aspect of Bishop’s enterprise, classical mathematics often received harsh criticism,
and he even went as far as announcing its demise (which has not materialised so
far) as follows.
Very possibly classical mathematics will cease to exist as an inde-
pendent discipline. ([14, p. 54])
Of course, Robinsonian19 Nonstandard Analysis is part of classical mathematics,
and therefore on the receiving end of Bishop’s criticism of classical mathematics.
Nonetheless, Bishop felt the need to single out Nonstandard Analysis on a number
of occasions. We now consider three such negative statements by Bishop about
Nonstandard Analysis, as they are relevant to the formulation of Bishop’s view on
Nonstandard Analysis. A much more thorough discussion of these matters may be
found in [51].
First of all, in the following quote Bishop criticises the apparent lack of meaning,
which to him means ‘computational content’, of Nonstandard Analysis, as well as
the latter’s introduction at the undergraduate level.
A more recent attempt at mathematics by formal finesse is non-
standard analysis. I gather that it has met with some degree of
19There are a number of constructive approaches to Nonstandard Analysis (See e.g. [5, 57,
59–62]) which we briefly discuss in Section 3.3.
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success, whether at the expense of giving significantly less mean-
ingful proofs I do not know. My interest in non-standard analysis is
that attempts are being made to introduce it into calculus courses.
It is difficult to believe that debasement of meaning could be carried
so far. [13, p. 513]
Secondly, the following quote on the ‘meaning’ of Nonstandard Analysis may be
found in Bishop’s notes from a summer school in New Mexico ([10]).
[Constructive and Nonstandard Analysis] are at opposite poles.
Constructivism is an attempt to deepen the meaning of mathemat-
ics; non-standard analysis, an attempt to dilute it further. ([10, p.
1-2])
Thirdly, Bishop was asked to review Keisler’s introduction to Nonstandard Analysis
[53] which has been used for teaching at the undergraduate level. The final sentence
of Bishop’s review reads as follows.
Now we have a calculus text that can be used to confirm their
experience of mathematics as an esoteric and meaningless exercise
in technique. [11, p. 208]
It is important to note that Bishop did not make his constructivist convictions
explicit in [11], i.e. the reader is not informed that Bishop equates ‘meaning’ and
‘computational content’. It should also be noted that Bishop’s views are not neces-
sarily shared by other constructivists. For instance, the intuitionist Heyting spoke
highly of Robinson’s Nonstandard Analysis ([43, 51]).
As it happens, Bishop’s review of [53] has been studied by historians of mathe-
matics and classified rather unfavourably as follows: Artigue [1, p. 172] describes
Bishop’s review as ‘virulent’; Dauben ([30]) as ‘vitriolic’; Davis and Hauser ([33])
as ‘hostile’; and Tall ([88]), as ‘extreme’. Furthermore, Robinson himself added the
following short but forceful judgement to his review of [9].
The sections of [Bishop’s] book that attempt to describe the philo-
sophical and historical background of [the] remarkable endeavor [of
Intuitionism] are more vigorous than accurate and tend to belittle
or ignore the efforts of others who have worked in the same general
direction ([73, p. 921]).
In light of these rather strong words, one has to wonder what specifically could be
wrong with Nonstandard Analysis, among the plethora fields of classical mathemat-
ics, that prompted Bishop’s ire and scorn? Katz and Katz ([51, §3.3]) discuss this
question in detail and suggest an explanation based on three technical reasons, and
a philosophical one. While their four arguments are perfectly valid in our opinion,
we would rather ‘address the elephant in the room’ as follows: As noted in Sections
4.1.1 and 4.1.2, Bishop considers his mathematics to be concerned with constructive
objects, i.e. those described by algorithms on the integers. The following quote is
worth repeating.
Everything attaches itself to number, and every mathematical state-
ment ultimately expresses the fact that if we perform certain com-
putations within the set of positive integers, we shall get certain
results. ([9, §1.1])
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This quote suggest a fundamental ontological divide between Bishop’s mathematics
and Nonstandard Analysis, as the latter by design is based on ideal objects (like
infinitesimals) with prima facia no algorithmic description at all. In this light, it is
not a stretch of the imagination to classify Nonstandard Analysis as fundamentally
non-constructive, i.e. antipodal to Bishop’s mathematics, or in Bishop’s words: an
attempt to dilute meaning/computational content further. Furthermore, this ‘first
impression’ is only confirmed by the fact that the ‘usual’ development of Nonstan-
dard Analysis involves quite non-constructive20 axioms. The latter is formulated
by Katz and Katz as:
[. . . ] the hyperreal approach incorporates an element of non-constructivity
at the basic level of the very number system itself. ([51, §3.3])
Finally, the aforementioned ‘first impression’ does not seem to disappear if one
considers more basic mathematics, e.g. arithmetic rather than set theory. Indeed,
Tennenbaum’s theorem [52, §11.3] ‘literally’ states that any nonstandard model of
Peano Arithmetic is not computable. What is meant is that for a nonstandard
modelM of Peano Arithmetic, the operations +M and ×M cannot be computably
defined in terms of the operations +N and ×N of the standard model N of Peano
Arithmetic. In other words, Robinson’s model-theoretic approach to Nonstandard
Analysis seems fundamentally non-constructive even at the level of arithmetic.
In light of the above, we arrive at a possible explanation why Bishop singled out
Nonstandard Analysis among all of classical mathematics: Bishop’s mathematics
(in his view) deals with ‘constructive objects given by an algorithm’ while (again in
his view) Nonstandard Analysis by contrast is based on ‘non-constructive objects
devoid of algorithmic description’. Thus, while classical mathematics is obviously
non-constructive in the sense of Bishop, Nonstandard Analysis seems to cheerfully
take non-construcitivity to a whole new level by adopting non-constructive objects
at a fundamental level. Almost as an aside, we arrive at Bishop’s critique of Non-
standard Analysis:
The presence of ideal objects in Nonstandard Analysis yields the absence of
computational content.
From Bishop’s point of view, the previous statement is almost trivial: Constructive
mathematics is built up from the ground (the integers) and all objects are based on
algorithms. Introducing ideal objects, as is done at a fundamental level in Nonstan-
dard Analysis, is so contrary to the approach in Bishop’s mathematics, the former
must lead to a realm devoid of computational content. To put it bluntly, Non-
standard Analysis thus occupies a special place in hell, i.e. classical mathematics,
according to Bishop.
In conclusion, we have provided an explanation why Bishop singled out Nonstan-
dard Analysis among all of classical mathematics. This explanation naturally led
us to Bishop’s critique of Nonstandard Analysis as formulated above. Note that
this critique is at least partially unfounded in light of the existence of construc-
tive Nonstandard Analysis as discussed in Section 3.3. Nonetheless, this existence
does not prove or disprove that classical Nonstandard Analysis is fundamentally
non-constructive.
20The usual development of Robinson’s Nonstandard Analysis proceeds via the construction
of a nonstandard model using a free ultrafilter. The existence of the latter is only slightly weaker
than the axiom of choice of ZFC ([93]).
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4.2. Connes’ critique of Nonstandard Analysis. The Fields medallist Alain
Connes has formulated negative criticism of classical Nonstandard Analysis in print
on at least seven occasions. The first table in [49, §3.1] runs a tally for the pe-
riod 1995-2007. Connes judgements range from inadequate and disappointing, to
a chimera and irremediable defect. However, the judgements most interesting to
us, especially in light of Bishop’s critique from the previous section, pertain to the
constructive21/computable nature of infinitesimals and Nonstandard Analysis, as
captured by the following quotes.
Thus a non-standard number gives us canonically a non-measurable
subset of [0, 1]. This is the end of the rope for being ‘explicit’ since
(from another side of logics) one knows that it is just impossible to
construct explicitely a non-measurable subset of [0, 1]! (Verbatim
copy of the text in [25])
The point is that as soon as you have a non-standard number, you
get a non-measurable set. And in Choquet’s circle, having well
studied the Polish school, we knew that every set you can name is
measurable. So it seemed utterly doomed to failure to try to use
non-standard analysis to do physics. ([26, p. 26])
The answer given by non-standard analysis, namely a nonstan-
dard real, is equally disappointing: every non-standard real canoni-
cally determines a (Lebesgue) non-measurable subset of the interval
[0, 1], so that it is impossible [85] to exhibit a single [nonstandard
real number]. The formalism that we propose will give a substantial
and computable answer to this question. ([27, p. 320])
Suppose that a dart is thrown to the target of [Fig. 5 on [28, p.
6207], at the top]; then what is the probability of hitting a given
point. [In [7] the authors claim that] the sought for [probability]
makes sense, as a nonstandard positive real. The problem with this
proposed solution is that there is no way one can exhibit this infin-
itesimal. [. . . ] Our theory of infinitesimal variables is completely
different [from Nonstandard Analysis], and it will give a precise
computable answer to the above question
Each of the previous quotes (and especially the last one) suggests that Nonstandard
Analysis is somehow fundamentally non-constructive21 or non-computable in na-
ture due to the presence of infinitesimals. Thus, we may formulate Connes critique
of Nonstandard Analysis as follows:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the absence of computational content.
As it happens, Connes refines this criticism in [28] by formulating three major
problems of Nonstandard Analysis which his proposed alternative formalism al-
legedly fixes. As discussed in [49–51], Connes’ formalism suffers from at least two
of these same problems. In particular, Katz and Leichtnam note the following:
Thus, two-thirds of Connes’ critique of Robinson’s infinitesimal ap-
proach can be said to be incoherent, in the specific sense of not
21Note that Connes uses the word ‘constructive’ as synonymous with ‘effective’ and ‘explicit’
from mainstream mathematics, i.e. no connection with constructivism seems present.
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being coherent with what Connes writes (approvingly) about his
own infinitesimal approach. ([50, p. 640])
Furthermore, Katz and Leichtman note that Connes’ formalism is rather non-
constructive in nature, going as far as requiring the Continuum Hypothesis in places
(See [50, Remark 5.1] for details), a statement known to be not provable or refutable
in the usual foundation of mathematics Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom
of choice.
Now, we should point out that Connes has previously espoused a platonist phi-
losophy of mathematics (See e.g. [24]), i.e. the motivations for his criticism of Non-
standard Analysis do not seem to stem from a constructivist view of mathematics.
As is clear from the above quote from [26, p. 26], Connes rather has pragmatic
motivations in mind, namely that (fundamentally) non-constructive mathematics
is useless for physics. Indeed, a major aspect of physics is the testing of hypothe-
ses against experimental data, nowadays done mostly on computers. But how can
this testing be done if the mathematical formalism at hand is fundamentally non-
constructive, as Connes claims Nonstandard Analysis to be due to the presence of
infinitesimals?
In conclusion, Connes’ critique of Nonstandard Analysis is similar to Bishop’s,
but with a different motivation (applicability to physics) and interpretation (no
indication of a computational model is given).
4.3. Conclusion: The Bishop-Connes critique. We have studied the critique
of Nonstandard Analysis by Bishop and Connes. We observed that Connes deems
Nonstandard Analysis devoid of computational content due to the latter being
based on ideal objects (infinitesimals in particular) at a fundamental level. This
makes Nonstandard Analysis unsuitable for physics, as literally claimed by Connes
(See Section 4.2), but no real foundational claims are made. By contrast, we argued
that Bishop’s strong rejection of Nonstandard Analysis stems from his foundational
beliefs: In Bishop’s version of constructivism, all objects are ultimately based on al-
gorithms, while Nonstandard Analysis is fundamentally based on ideal objects (the
most famous example being infinitesimals) with no (obvious) algorithmic content
whatsoever. Thus, we arrive at the Bishop-Connes critique:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the absence of computational content.
which stems from very different observations and beliefs, and in which ‘computa-
tional content’ has different interpretations for Connes and Bishop.
Finally, we have identified the Bishop-Connes critique as the main objection to
Nonstandard Analysis by Bishop and Connes. We now point out an alternative
view put forward by the second referee:
While it is true that many people believe the Bishop-Connes cri-
tique (quite possibly including Bishop and Connes), this critique is
probably more accurately viewed as one leg supporting their real
critique of Nonstandard Analysis. Taking it down does weaken the
position (and especially, I suspect, its persuasiveness to those not
already persuaded), but it is unlikely that Bishop, Connes, or oth-
ers strongly critical of the meaningfulness of nonstandard analysis
would be moved by this article.
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Though beyond the scope of this paper, we invite and welcome discussion on this
topic, especially what other legs the Bishop-Connes critique rests on.
5. Reverse formalism
5.1. Introduction. As established in the previous sections, the Bishop-Connes
critique of Nonstandard Analysis is as follows:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the absence of computational content.
This section is dedicated to establishing the opposite claim, namely
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the ubiquitous presence of computational content.
In particular, we shall observe that infinitesimals provide an elegant shorthand for
expressing computational content. To this end, we shall exhibit a direct translation
between (proofs of) theorems of Nonstandard Analysis and (proofs of) theorems
rich in computational content, similar to the ‘reversals’ from Reverse Mathematics
discussed in Section 2. The latter program also plays an important role in gauging
the scope of this translation, in particular the ‘Big Five’ classification, in Section
5.5.
We label the aforementioned translation as a case of ‘reverse formalism’, as it
bestows Bishop-Connes style meaning (i.e. computational content) onto Nonstan-
dard Analysis, and is similar to the reversals in Reverse Mathematics. We shall
start with a basic example of reverse formalism stemming from probability theory
in Section 5.2. We further study two examples from analysis in Section 5.3, and
consider a full-fledged theorem in Section 5.4. As hinted at above, our notion of
reverse formalism involves a (algorithmic) translation of proofs. We discuss the
scope of this translation in Section 5.5, while possible criticism of this approach is
discussed in Section 6.2.
5.2. A basic example from probability theory. We study our first example
of reverse formalism: a basic ‘computational’ result from probability theory will
be obtained from a qualitative result in Nonstandard Analysis. As it happens,
the latter has been used to model qualitative phenomena (See Section B for a
considerable but non-exhaustive list), i.e. the potential applications are much richer
than the following example.
Example 5.1. Suppose P is a fixed probability measure and suppose E1, E2 are
fixed collections of events expressible by an internal formula of P. We would like to
express the observation that if an event A ∈ E1 is highly unlikely, then any event
B ∈ E2 is also highly unlikely. This expression can be formalised as:
(5.1) (∀stA ∈ E1)(∀
stB ∈ E2)
(
P (A) ≈ 0→ P (B) ≈ 0
)
,
where we assume that A,B are standard as the latter predicate can also be in-
terpreted as ‘observable’ (See [71, §3.5.15] and [42, §5.1]). The following does not
change much if we drop the ‘st’ in (5.1) for A,B: The only change is that the
extracted terms s, t below do not depend on these variables anymore.
Now suppose (5.1) is provable in P; we use Theorem 3.4 to obtain computational
information from the former. Firstly, replace ‘≈’ by its definition:
(5.2) (∀stA ∈ E1, B ∈ E2)
(
(∀stN ∈ N)(P (A) < 1
N
)→ (∀stk)(|P (B)| < 1
k
)
)
.
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Secondly, bringing outside all standard quantifiers, we obtain:
(5.3) (∀stA ∈ E1, B ∈ E2, k)(∃
stN ∈ N)
(
(P (A) < 1
N
)→ (|P (B)| < 1
k
)
)
,
which has the right form to apply Theorem 3.4 (i.e. to the statement ‘P ⊢ (5.3)’).
Hence, we obtain a term t such that E-PAω proves
(5.4) (∀A ∈ E1, B ∈ E2, k)(∃N ∈ t(A,B, k))
(
(P (A) < 1
N
)→ (|P (B)| < 1
k
)
)
.
Recalling that t yields a finite list of terms, define s(A,B, k) as the maximum of all
t(A,B, k)(i) for i < |t(A,B, k)|. We finally obtain that E-PAω proves
(5.5) (∀A ∈ E1, B ∈ E2, k)
(
(P (A) < 1
s(A,B,k) )→ (|P (B)| <
1
k
)
)
,
where s is a computer program as discussed in Section 3.2.3.
In the previous example, we started from (5.1) which expresses that if some event
A ∈ E1 is unlikely, then so is every event B ∈ E2, and we obtained (5.5) which
expresses that to guarantee that B ∈ E2 has probability less than
1
k
, A ∈ E1 should
have probability less than 1
s(A,B,k) . Thus, we also know ‘how unlikely’ A should be
to guarantee that B has less than 1
k
probability thanks to the statement (5.1).
In contrast to the Bishop-Connes critique, statements of Nonstandard Analy-
sis (also involving infinitesimals) like (5.1) do have some computational content,
namely (5.5). As noted at the beginning of this section, (5.1) is just one example
among many (See also Example 5.3 below).
Next, we show that (5.5), the ‘computational version of (5.1)’, is also ‘meta-
equivalent’ to (5.1) as follows.
Theorem 5.2.
(1) From a proof in P of (5.1), a term22 s can be extracted such that (5.5) is
provable in E-PAω.
(2) Let s be a term. From a proof in E-PAω of (5.5), a proof in P of (5.1) can
be extracted.
(3) Let s be a term. The system H proves that (5.5)→ (5.1).
Proof. The first item has been established in Example 5.1. For the second item,
since P is an extension of E-PAω, a proof of (5.5) in the latter is also valid in the
former. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3.2.1, the axioms of P imply (i) that
every term in the language of E-PAω is standard and (ii) that a standard object
applied to standard input yields standard output (See Definition A.3). In particular,
for the term s in (5.5), we have that s(k) is standard for standard k,A,B. Hence,
‘E-PAω ⊢ (5.5)’ yields a proof in P of (5.3) (taking N = s(k,A,B)), and the latter
formula immediately implies (5.1). For the third item, it suffices to observe that H
also includes the basic axioms from Definition A.3 and repeat the previous part of
the proof. 
The previous theorem is our first example of reverse formalism: We start from
a statement (5.1) in Nonstandard Analysis and obtain its ‘computational version’
(5.5) thanks to Theorem 3.4. Perhaps surprisingly, (5.5) in turn implies (5.1) in the
sense of the second and third item of Theorem 5.2. In this way, we may call (5.1)
and (5.5) ‘meta-equivalent’ similar to the reversals in Reverse Mathematics, as the
22As noted in Section 3.2.3, terms obtained from Theorem 3.4 are indeed algorithms, and we
use these two words interchangeably in the context of system P.
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former statements are ‘equivalent in the meta-theory’. Furthermore, while these
statements are equivalent in the aforementioned sense, (5.1) is arguably a simpler
statement than (5.5), lending credence to our claim that infinitesimals provide an
elegant shorthand for expressing computational content.
Moreover, in the proof of the second item of Theorem 5.2, the term s as in (5.5)
is standard inside P and thus gives rise to (5.3). The latter in turn implies (5.1),
i.e. computational information (in the form of s) is converted to external predicates
(‘≈’ in (5.1) and ‘st’ in (5.3)). Similarly, in the proof of the first item, applying
Theorem 3.4 to (5.3) (which follows from (5.1)), a term t is obtained computing an
upper bound on N in terms of k,A,B. In particular, the latter four variables occur
as standard quantifiers in (5.3) while the rest of the formula (which is internal) is
ignored, i.e. no computational content is provided with regard to e.g. ‘P (B) < 1
k
’.
In other words, external predicates (‘≈’ in (5.1) and ‘st’ in (5.3)) are translated
to computational information (in the form of t and s). In conclusion, external
predicates in (5.1) give rise to the computational content in (5.5) and vice versa.
This observation nicely supports our claim from the introduction that
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the presence of computational content.
Actually, the results in Theorem 5.2 and previous discussion suggest that the pres-
ence of nonstandard objects is somehow equivalent (in the meta-theory) to the
presence of computational content. We will discuss the ubiquity (as claimed in
Section 5.1) of said computational content in Section 5.5.
Next, suggested by the third item of Theorem 5.2, there is also constructive con-
tent (in the sense of constructive mathematics) to be found in Theorem 5.2: Most
importantly, we observe that the step from the ‘computational version’ (5.5) to the
nonstandard version (5.1) can be done in the constructive system H (and actually
only the basic axioms from Definition A.3 are needed). In turn, the translation
from [6] used in Theorem 3.4 and the first item of Theorem 5.2 can be formalised
in any reasonable23 system of constructive mathematics. In fact, the formalisation
of the results in [6] in the proof assistant Agda (based on Martin-Lo¨f’s constructive
type theory [56]) is underway in [94].
Finally, we list one more example of a qualitative statement from Nonstandard
Analysis which the reader may study in the same way as Example 5.1.
Example 5.3. An intuitive statement about conditional probabilities is:
If P (A) is low and P (B) is not low, then P (A|B) is low,
and the latter may be formalised as follows in Nonstandard Analysis:
(5.6) (∀A,B)
(
(P (A) ≈ 0 ∧ P (B) 6≈ 0)→ P (A|B) ≈ 0
)
.
Assuming24 that P proves (5.6), Theorem 3.4 yields a term s such that
(∀k, k′ ∈ N)(∀A,B)
(
(P (A) < s(k, k′) ∧ P (B) > 1
k
)→ P (A|B) < 1
k′
)
,
23Here, a ‘reasonable’ system is one which can prove the usual properties of finite lists, for
which the presence of the exponential function suffices. In particular, a subsystem of primitive
recursive arithmetic, where the latter is claimed to correspond to Hilbert’s finitist mathematics
([87]), suffices.
24It is easy to prove (5.6) in P using Bayes’ theorem P (A|B) =
P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
for P (B) 6= 0, and
basic properties of infinitesimals.
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and a version of Theorem 5.1 can be obtained easily. Note that the previous formula
expresses how unlikely A and how likely B have to be to guarantee that P (A|B) is
unlikely in the sense of being less than 1
k′
.
5.3. Basic examples involving continuity and convergence. We study our
second example of reverse formalism: basic ‘constructive’ definitions from analysis
will be obtained from the associated definitions in Nonstandard Analysis. We study
uniform continuity and convergence inspired by Example 3.5. These notions are
defined as follows in Nonstandard Analysis.
Definition 5.4. A function f is nonstandard uniformly continuous on [0, 1] if
(5.7) (∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])[x ≈ y → f(x) ≈ f(y)].
A sequence x(·) nonstandard converges to x if
(5.8) (∀N ∈ N)
(
¬st(N)→ xN ≈ x
)
.
The ‘constructive’ definitions of uniform continuity and convergence (as em-
ployed by Bishop) are just the ‘usual’ epsilon-delta definitions with moduli.
Definition 5.5. f is uniformly continuous on [0, 1] with modulus s if
(5.9) (∀k ∈ N)(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])
(
|x− y| < 1
s(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| <
1
k
)
.
A sequence x(·) converges to x with modulus N if
(5.10) (∀k, n ∈ N)(n ≥ N(k)→ |xn − x| <
1
k
)
Similar to Theorem 5.2 and Example 3.5, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6.
(1) From a proof in P of (5.7) (resp. (5.8)), a term25 s (resp. N) can be ex-
tracted such that (5.9) (resp. (5.10)) is provable in E-PAω.
(2) Let s,N be terms. From a proof in E-PAω of (5.9) (resp. (5.10)), a proof
in P of (5.7) (resp. (5.8)) can be extracted.
(3) Let s,N be terms. The system H proves (5.9)→ (5.7) and (5.10)→ (5.8).
Proof. For the first item, the case of uniform continuity is proved in the same way
as in Example 3.5. For the case of convergence, (5.8) implies by definition:
(5.11) (∀N ∈ N)
(
(∀stm)(N ≥ m)→ (∀stk)(|xN − x| <
1
k
)
.
Bringing outside the standard quantifiers as far as possible, we obtain
(5.12) (∀stk)(∀N ∈ N)(∃stm)
(
N ≥ m→ |xN − x| <
1
k
)
.
Applying idealisation I to the underlined formula, we obtain a finite list z of natural
numbers such that (∀N ∈ N)(∃m ∈ z) in (5.12). With m0 equal to the maximum
of all elements in z, (5.12) becomes
(5.13) (∀stk)(∃stm0)(∀N ∈ N)
(
N ≥ m0 → |xN − x| <
1
k
)
.
Applying Theorem 3.4 to ‘P ⊢ (5.13)’, we obtain a term t such that
(5.14) (∀k)(∃m0 ∈ t(k))(∀N ∈ N)
(
N ≥ m0 → |xN − x| <
1
k
)
25As noted in Section 3.2.3, terms obtained from Theorem 3.4 are indeed algorithms, and we
use these two words interchangeably.
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is provable in E-PAω. Define N(k) as the maximum natural number in the list t(k)
and note that N is as required by the theorem.
For the second item, a term N is standard for standard input in P, hence a proof
of (5.10) in E-PAω yields a proof of (5.13) in P. The latter immediately implies
(5.8), as all nonstandard numbers are bigger than all standard ones. The second
item for the case of uniform continuity is similar. The third item is proved in
exactly the same way as the second one.  
The previous theorem is our second example of reverse formalism, and the same
observations as in the previous section can be made: For the nonstandard state-
ments (5.7) and (5.8), there are ‘meta-equivalent’ computational versions (5.9) and
(5.10). The nonstandard versions are much shorter, and their use of infinitesimals
as in ‘≈’ provides an elegant shorthand for the existence of moduli. In particular,
the latter give rise to the predicates ‘≈’ in the nonstandard versions, and vice versa
by (the proof of) Theorem 5.6. As discussed in Section 5.5, similar results exist for
other basic notions from analysis.
The modulus functions from Theorem 5.6 are important for the following rea-
son: moduli for (uniform) continuity and convergence are indispensable26 parts of
the constructive definitions of these notions (See [9, p. 34 and p. 26]) in Bishop’s
constructive mathematics. Thus, in direct contradiction with Bishop’s critique of
Nonstandard Analysis, the nonstandard definitions of continuity and convergence
have computational content, namely the same ‘indispensable’ constructive content
required by Bishop.
In conclusion, we have obtained a second example of reverse formalism which
seems to generalise nicely to other basic notions from analysis, anticipating the huge
scope of Theorem 3.4 to be discussed in Section 5.5. Our example even included
constructive content in the form of Bishop’s ‘indispensable’ modulus functions.
5.4. A basic example from high-school mathematics. We discuss an example
of reverse formalism based on an actual theorem of (in some parts of the world)
high-school mathematics.
5.4.1. Preliminaries. The most basic notions of analysis, going back to high-school
mathematics, include continuity and Riemann integration. The former was intro-
duced in the previous sections, while the latter is defined as follows.
Definition 5.7. [Riemann integration]
(1) A partition of [0, 1] is any sequence pi = (0, t0, x1, t1, . . . , xM−1, tM−1, 1).
We write ‘pi ∈ P ([0, 1])’ to denote that pi is such a partition.
(2) For pi ∈ P ([0, 1]), ‖pi‖ is the mesh, i.e. the largest distance between two
adjacent partition points xi and xi+1.
(3) For pi ∈ P ([0, 1]) and f : R → R, the real Spi(f) :=
∑M−1
i=0 f(ti)(xi − xi+1)
is the Riemann sum of f and pi.
(4) A function f is nonstandard integrable on [0, 1] if
(5.15) (∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
[
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ ≈ 0→ Spi(f) ≈ Spi′(f)
]
.
Bishop proves the following theorem regarding (uniform) continuity and Rie-
mann integration inside BISH in [9, Theorem 9].
26Bishop uses the exact words ‘indispensable part’ with regard to moduli in [9, p. 34].
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Theorem 5.8 (RIEef(t)). If a function is uniformly continuous on the unit interval,
then it is Riemann integrable there, i.e. for all f : R → R and g : N → N, we have
(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1], k)(|x− y| < 1
g(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| ≤
1
k
)
(5.16)
→ (∀n)(∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
(
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ < 1
t(g,n) → |Spi(f)− Spi′(f)| ≤
1
n
)
,
Here, t is a computer program or ‘algorithm’ in the sense of Bishop’s Constructive
Analysis. Recall that a ‘modulus of uniform continuity g’ as in (5.16) is part and
parcel of constructive continuity (See [9, Def. 9]). Thus, Bishop’s theorem provides
an algorithm (namely t) to compute a ‘modulus of Riemann integration’ 1
t(g,·) from
a modulus of uniform continuity g.
Now consider the nonstandard version of the theorem that uniform continuity
implies Riemann integration on the unit interval.
Theorem 5.9 (RIEns). Every function f : R → R is nonstandard integrable on [0, 1]
if it is nonstandard uniformly continuous there.
Theorem 5.9 is clearly part of Nonstandard Analysis, and even commits the
‘original sin’ (according to Connes) of non-constructivity by mentioning infinitesi-
mals27. Hence, RIEns should be devoid of computational content according to the
Biship-Connes critique. Nonetheless, we have the following theorem which was first
proved in [78, §3.1].
Theorem 5.10. From a proof of RIEns in P, an algorithm t can be extracted such
that RIEef(t) is provable in E-PA
ω. Each step in the proof of RIEns is a step in the
algorithm t. The same holds for H and E-HAω.
Proof. The proof of [47, Prop. 12.3] goes through for nonstandard uniformly contin-
uous functions as in RIEns (without the use of Transfer). Similar to the treatment
of continuity in the previous section, RIEns can be brought in the right form to
apply Theorem 3.4. The extracted term t yields a term s such that RIEef(s). For
details, we refer to the proof of Theorem 3.3 in [78, §3.1]. 
We conclude that RIEns is a theorem of classical Nonstandard Analysis (namely
provable in P), and that Theorem 3.4 allows us to extract considerable computa-
tional content. In particular, from the proof of RIEns, we can ‘read off’ the algorithm
t such that RIEef(t), which is a theorem of BISH.
Thus, the Theorem 5.10 at least partially contradicts the Bishop-Connes critique
as we have exhibited the non-trivial computational content of a theorem of Non-
standard Analysis. The case of RIEns is not an isolated accident: As it turns out,
the ‘term extraction theorem’, namely Theorem 3.4, has an extremely wide scope
as discussed in Section 5.5.
In the next section, we ‘upgrade’ RIEef(t) to a ‘more constructive version’ which
is meta-equivalent (as in Theorems 5.2 and 5.6) to RIEns. This provides us with a
non-trivial example of reverse formalism.
27The predicate ‘x ≈ y’ is usually read as ‘the distance between x and y is infinitesimal’.
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5.4.2. Another example of reverse formalism. We have observed that classical Non-
standard Analysis has computational content by way of an illustrative example
involving RIEns and RIEef(t). We now show that the former is intimately linked
(meta-equivalent) to an ‘even more constructive’ version RIEpw(s). In particular,
we show that RIEpw(s) and RIEns are one and the same theorem up to a syntactical
translation of their proofs.
First of all, RIEpw(s) is defined as a ‘very constructive’ version of RIEef(t).
Theorem 5.11 (RIEpw(s)). For all f : R → R, g : N → N, and k
′ we have
(∀k ≤ s(g, k′))(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])(|x− y| < 1
g(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| ≤
1
k
)
→ (∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
(
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ < 1
s(g,k′) → |Spi(f)− Spi(f)| ≤
1
k′
)
.
As suggested by the notation, RIEpw(s) is indeed a ‘pointwise’ version of RIEef(t):
While the latter applies to continuous functions, the former applies to functions
which are only continuous up to some precision (as measured by ‘(∀k ≤ s(g, k′))’
in the antecedent). In particular, RIEpw(s) tells us ‘how much’ continuity is needed
to approximate the Riemann integral up to precision 1
k′
.
The following theorem tells us that RIEns can be translated to RIEpw(s) and
vice versa. In this way, RIEpw(s) bestows its computational content onto RIEns, a
theorem of Nonstandard Analysis, i.e. we have found our first example of ‘reverse
formalism’.
Theorem 5.12.
(1) From a proof of RIEns in P, an algorithm s can be extracted such that
RIEpw(s) is provable in E-PA
ω.
(2) Let s be an algorithm. From a proof in E-PAω of RIEpw(s), a proof in P of
RIEns can be extracted.
(3) Let s be an algorithm; then H proves that RIEpw(s)→ RIEns.
Proof. The first item is proved in [78, Rem. 3.9]; similar results may be found
in [81]. For the other items, it suffices to note that v produces standard output
for standard input in P and H, which follows form the ‘basic axioms’ discussed in
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. In this way, RIEns easily follows from RIEpw(v) in the same
way as in the proofs of Theorems 5.2 and 5.6.  
It is interesting to note that the third item can be proved using more ‘elementary’
systems than H, i.e. we only need the basic axioms from Definition A.3.
Again, the connection between RIEns and RIEpw(v) is not an isolated accident:
it is shown in [78, 81] that term extraction via Theorem 3.4 can always produce
‘pointwise’ theorems like RIEpw(v), which in turn imply the original theorem of
Nonstandard Analysis as in Theorem 5.12.
The previous theorem is our third example of reverse formalism, and the same
observations as in the previous sections can be made: For the nonstandard state-
ment RIEns, there is a ‘meta-equivalent’ computational version RIEpw(s). The non-
standard version is much shorter, and its use of infinitesimals as in ‘≈’ provides
an elegant shorthand for the existence of moduli. In particular, the latter give rise
to the predicates‘ ≈’ in the former, and vice versa by Theorem 5.12. As discussed
in Section 5.5, similar results exist for a large part of theorems from Nonstandard
Analysis.
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What is left is to discuss is the scope of reverse formalism (Section 5.5) and
possible criticism (Section 6.2).
5.5. The scope of reverse formalism. We discuss the scope of reverse formalism
and the central Theorem 3.4 in particular. In light of the latter, formulas of the
form (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y) (ϕ internal) play a central role and we shall refer to such
formulas as ‘normal forms’. Based on the latter, we introduce pure Nonstandard
Analysis, i.e. that part of the latter falling within the scope of Theorem 3.4, and
hence reverse formalism. This turns out to be a considerable part of Nonstandard
Analysis, as is clear from the following informal description.
Description 5.13 (Pure Nonstandard Analysis). A theorem of pure Nonstandard
Analysis is built up as follows.
(i) Only nonstandard definitions (of continuity, compactness, . . . ) are used;
no epsilon-delta definitions are used. The former have (nice) normal forms
and give rise to the associated constructive definitions from Figure 1.
(ii) Normal forms are closed under implication by Theorem C.1.
(iii) Normal forms are closed under prefixing a quantifier over all infinitesimals
by Theorem C.2, i.e. if Φ(ε) has a normal form, so does (∀ε ≈ 0)Φ(ε).
(iv) Fragments of the axioms Transfer and Standard Part corresponding to the
Big Five of Reverse Mathematics have normal forms, as shown in [78, §4].
(v) Formulas28 involving the Loeb measure (See [79]) have normal forms.
Regarding item i and as noted in Example 3.5, nonstandard definitions give rise
to the associated constructive definition-with-a-modulus. The following list pro-
vides an overview for common notions29, where Π11-TRANS is Transfer limited to
Π11-formulas (See [78, §4] or Section D.2), while (µ
2) and (µ1) are the functional
versions of ACA0 and Π
1
1-CA0 (See [2] or Section D.2).
Nonstandard Analysis definition Constructive/functional definition
nonstandard convergence convergence with a modulus
nonstandard (uniform) continuity (uniform) continuity with a modulus
F-compactness29 total boundedness
nonstandard differentiability differentiability with a modulus
and the derivative given
nonstandard Riemann integration Riemann integration with a modulus
Π01-TRANS Feferman’s mu-operator (µ
2)
Π11-TRANS Feferman’s second mu-operator (µ1)
Figure 1. Nonstandard and constructive definitions
Regarding item iv, it is shown in [78] that Theorem 3.4 applies to (nonstandard
versions of) the Big Five of Reverse Mathematics; For completeness, three represen-
tative examples are given in Section D below. Furthermore, it is shown in [77, 81]
28We stress that item v should be interpreted in a specific narrow technical sense (beyond the
scope of this paper), namely as discussed in [79].
29A space is F-compact in Nonstandard Analysis if there is a discrete grid which approximates
every point of the space up to infinitesimal error, i.e. the intuitive notion of compactness from
physics and engineering.
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that the same holds for the theorems in the Reverse Mathematics zoo (which gath-
ers exceptions not fitting within the Big Five). By the observations in Section 2,
Theorem 3.4 seems to applies to most of ordinary mathematics.
In other words, Theorem 3.4 allows us to extract computational content from
theorems of Nonstandard Analysis, while the scope of the former theorem is most
of ordinary mathematics, as qualified by the classification of Reverse Mathematics
in Section 2. The computational content of classical Nonstandard Analysis is thus
seen to be vast.
The previous observation is important as we noted in Section 2.2 that Bishop
stresses the importance of studying actual mathematics rather than -in his own
words- dinky formal systems (but see Section 6.2.1). For this reason, we list some
of the theorems studied in [78] in the same way as Theorem 5.12: The fundamental
theorem of calculus, the Picard and Peano existence theorems, the intermediate
value theorem, the uniform limit theorem, Dini’s theorem, Heine’s theorem, the
monotone convergence theorem, the Heine-Borel lemma, the Stone-Weierstraß the-
orem, and the Weierstraß maximum and approximation theorems. Twice as many
‘nameless’ theorems are studied in [78]. Several representative examples are listed
in Section D.
6. Conclusion
We formulate the conclusion to this paper and formulate possible criticism of
this conclusion, reverse formalism in particular.
6.1. Conclusion on reverse formalism. We have provided examples of reverse
formalism in support of the claim:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the ubiquitous presence of computational content.
We are hopeful we have convinced the reader of this claim for the case where ‘com-
putational content’ has a mainstream mathematics meaning. In other words, we
believe we have effectively refuted Connes’ critique by showing that theorems of
(some kind of) computable mathematics can be obtained from theorems of Non-
standard Analysis, and vice versa.
The case of Bishop’s critique is different as our results, while rich in compu-
tational content, were all obtained in classical mathematics, thus not really con-
structive mathematics. Nonetheless, we have obtained ‘indispensable’ constructive
content from Nonstandard Analysis in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 in the form of modulus
functions. One can probably endlessly debate the status of a theorem of construc-
tive mathematics proved via classical means. We shall therefore take the middle
ground and hope that Bishop would have acknowledged the ubiquitous presence of
some kind of computational content in Nonstandard Analysis (as he has done for
Brouwer’s intuitionistic mathematics and the Russian school of recursive mathe-
matics), with the reservation that this content is not exactly what he has in mind
in his branch of constructivism.
As to criticism of reverse formalism, perhaps the easiest and most straightforward
way of dismissing the latter is based on the rejection of proof translations (as the
latter are used in an essential way to prove Theorem 3.4 in [6,78]). We shall discuss
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this argument at length in Section 6.2 while we refer to [54] for an introduction to
proof translations, also called ‘functional interpretations’.
This discussion has wider ranging implications as follows: proof translations
provide a method of converting proofs of certain theorems in a given ‘strong’ system
into a proof in a given ‘weak’ system, often adding extra computational information
to the theorem in the process. An interesting question emerges:
Given a proof p of a theorem T in classical logic, and a proof trans-
lation Ξ formulated in constructive mathematics and outputting
proofs in the latter; in what way is the resulting theorem and proof
Ξ(p, T ) ‘constructive’?
We do not claim to answer this question definitively, but we do provide a number
of arguments in Section 6.2 against the dismissal of reverse formalism based on the
rejection of proof translations.
6.2. Criticism of reverse formalism. We discuss possible a criticism of reverse
formalism, the proof translation from [6] needed to prove Theorem 3.4 in particu-
lar. We do not claim to provide definite answers, but we do provide a number of
arguments against the rejection of proof translations in our context.
6.2.1. An emphasis on informal mathematics. An easy way to dismiss reverse for-
malism is to point out its reliance on formal systems (the proof translations in [6]
in particular) and that Bishop was against the use of the latter in his branch of
constructivism. We now argue against this easy dismissal as follows.
First of all, while Bishop has indeed sneered at formal systems (See Section 2.2
for two telling quotes), he did change his mind later in life. Let us first consider the
following historical remark by Nerode from the proceedings of Bishop’s memorial
meeting ([8]).
After the publication of his book Constructive Analysis, Bishop
made a tour of the eastern universities that included Cornell. He
told me then that he was trying to communicate his viewpoint di-
rectly to the mathematical community, rather than through the
logicians. He associated the logicians with defending the turf of
codified formal systems, while he himself believed in the free exer-
cise of positive affirmative mathematical faculties, free of artificial
formal limitations. After the eastern tour was over, he said the trip
may have been counterproductive. He felt that his mathematical
audiences were not taking the work seriously. He was surprised to
get a more sympathetic hearing from the logicians. ([58, p. 79],
underlining in original)
After the aforementioned ‘sympathetic hearing’ from logicians, Bishop indeed be-
came more open to formal systems, as is clear from the following quote:
Another important foundational problem is to find a formal system
that will efficiently express existing predictive mathematics. I think
we should keep the formalism as primitive as possible, starting with
a minimal system and enlarging it only if the enlargement serves
a genuine mathematical need. In this way the formalism and the
mathematics will hopefully interact to the advantage of both. ([14,
p. 60])
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Hence, the blanket statement ‘Bishop was against the use of formal systems’ does
not do justice to history; the previous quote implies it is plainly wrong.
Secondly, even if we follow the early Bishop in his rejection of formal systems
trying to capture his constructive mathematics, the latter is not the goal of reverse
formalism or proof translations in general. The only claim being made is that one
can obtain via the proof translations certain results in constructive mathematics. As
it happens, proof translations and Bishop’s later views on constructive mathematics
are compatible, and even intimately related, as follows: Bishop discusses in [14,
p. 56] the concept of numerical implication an alternative constructive notion of
implication based on Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation (the latter is also the basis
for the proof translation in [6] and the proof of Theorem 3.4).
Bishop notes that in practice the usual definition of implication amounts to
numerical implication. Furthermore, Bishop conjectures that numerical implication
can be derived constructively, while his derivation in [14] uses non-constructive
principles like independence of premises and Markov’s principle. As it happens,
system H contains nonstandard versions of the latter two axioms (See Definition
A.9) and these axioms are essential in proving the Characterization Theorem ([6,
Theorem 5.8]) for the proof translation of H in the case of implication.
While the previous is highly suggestive, we will not push things further than ob-
serving that Bishop’s later views (esp. the notion of so-called numerical implication)
were strongly inspired by proof translations.
6.2.2. An emphasis on proofs. As it is clear from the definition of the BHK in-
terpretation in Section 4.1.1, constructive mathematics has a certain emphasis on
proofs. This is also clear from the following quotes.
The basic tenets [of intuitionism] may be summarized as follows.
[. . . ] (b) It does not make sense to think of truth or falsity of a
mathematical statement independently of our knowledge concern-
ing the statement. A statement is true if we have proof of it, and
false if we can show that the assumption that there is a proof for
the statement leads to a contradiction. For an arbitrary statement
we can therefore not assert that it is either true or false. ([89, I.1.6])
From an intuitionistic standpoint, therefore, an understanding of
a mathematical statement consists in the capacity to recognize a
proof of it when presented with one; and the truth of such a state-
ment can consist only in the existence of such a proof. ([36, p.
5])
As another case in point, Bridges’ paper Constructive truth in practice ([18]) is
devoted (mostly) to Bishop’s mathematics and discusses provability at length, but
does not even mention the word truth except in the title.
Now, we do not wish to imply that there is anything wrong with this focus
on proof; it is in fact a natural consequence of the constructivist philosophy of
mathematics. However, in our opinion, the constructive preoccupation with proof
seems difficult to square with a rejection of proof translations. Rather, one would
expect constructivists to embrace the latter as a ‘logical next step’, again in our
opinion.
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In conclusion, we have observed that there is a focus on proofs in constructive
mathematics. In this light, the rejection of proof translations by constructivists
seems odd, to say the least.
6.2.3. An emphasis on the mystical. This section is perhaps the most controversial
of this paper. Our message is however simple: Bishop faulted Brouwer for his meta-
physical writings, while a rejection of certain results obtained by proof translations
-in our opinion- has the danger of going off into metaphysical speculation again.
Firstly, consider the following quote by Bishop on Brouwer’s intuitionism.
More important, Brouwer’s system itself had traces of idealism and,
worse, of metaphysical speculation. There was a preoccupation
with the philosophical aspects of constructivism at the expense of
concrete mathematical activity. ([9, p. 6])
It cannot be denied that Brouwer’s work ([22]) contains metaphysical speculation
and elements of mysticism (See also [44, 45]). We do not wish to judge Brouwer or
intuitionism on this basis, but merely point out this fact and Bishop’s view on this
matter. We now reconsider the question:
Given a proof p of a theorem T in classical logic, and a proof trans-
lation Ξ formulated in constructive mathematics and outputting
proofs in the latter; in what way is the resulting theorem and proof
Ξ(p, T ) ‘constructive’?
Now, it has been suggested that certain extensions of Heyting arithmetic like HAω
(See e.g. [35]) may serve as formalisations for Bishop’s mathematics. Hence, proofs
in Heyting arithmetic HAω produced by a proof interpretation which may be formu-
lated in (a suitable extension of) Heyting arithmetic should count as constructive
mathematics, even if the original proof (the input of the proof translation; a finite
list of symbols) made use of classical logic.
There are no formal objections one can bring against the previous claim, as the
output of the proof translation as well as its verification take place in a formal
system for constructive mathematics. There are perhaps other objections one can
bring against this claim, but our reply would be that there is the danger of going
off into metaphysical speculation which was exactly what Bishop faulted Brouwer
for and tried to avoid.
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Appendix A. The formal systems P and H in full detail
A.1. Go¨del’s system T . In this section, we briefly introduce Go¨del’s system T
and the associated systems E-PAω and E-PAω∗. In his famous Dialectica paper
([41]), Go¨del defines an interpretation of intuitionistic arithmetic into a quantifier-
free calculus of functionals. This calculus is now known as ‘Go¨del’s system T ’, and
is essentially just primitive recursive arithmetic ([23, §1.2.10]) with the schema of
recursion expanded to all finite types. The set of all finite types T is:
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(i) 0 ∈ T and (ii) If σ, τ ∈ T then (σ → τ) ∈ T ,
where 0 is the type of natural numbers, and σ → τ is the type of mappings from
objects of type σ to objects of type τ . Hence, Go¨del’s system T includes ‘recursor’
constants Rρ for every finite type ρ ∈ T , defining primitive recursion as follows:
(PR) Rρ(f, g, 0) := f and Rρ(f, g, n+ 1) := g(n,Rρ(f, g, n)),
for fρ and g0→(ρ→ρ). The system E-PAω is a combination of Peano Arithmetic
and system T , and the full axiom of extensionality (E). The detailed definition
of E-PAω may be found in [54, §3.3]; We do introduce the notion of equality and
extensionality in E-PAω, as these notions are needed below.
Definition A.1. [Equality] The system E-PAω includes equality between natural
numbers ‘=0’ as a primitive. Equality ‘=τ ’ for type τ -objects x, y is then:
(A.1) [x =τ y] ≡ (∀z
τ1
1 . . . z
τk
k )[xz1 . . . zk =0 yz1 . . . zk]
if the type τ is composed as τ ≡ (τ1 → . . . → τk → 0). The usual inequality
predicate ‘≤0’ between numbers has an obvious definition, and the predicate ‘≤τ ’
is just ‘=τ ’ with ‘=0’ replaced by ‘≤0’ in (A.1). The axiom of extensionality is the
statement that for all ρ, τ ∈ T , we have:
(E) (∀xρ, yρ, ϕρ→τ )
[
x =ρ y → ϕ(x) =τ ϕ(y)
]
,
Next, we introduce E-PAω∗, a definitional extension of E-PAω from [6] with a
type for finite sequences. In particular, the set T ∗ is defined as:
(i) 0 ∈ T ∗, (ii) If σ, τ ∈ T ∗ then (σ → τ) ∈ T ∗, and (iii) If σ ∈ T ∗, then σ∗ ∈ T ∗,
where σ∗ is the type of finite sequences of objects of type σ. The system E-PAω∗
includes (PR) for all ρ ∈ T ∗, as well as dedicated ‘list recursors’ to handle finite
sequences for any ρ∗ ∈ T ∗. A detailed definition of E-PAω∗ may be found in [6, §2.1].
We now introduce some notations specific to E-PAω∗, as also used in [6].
Notation A.2 (Finite sequences). The system E-PAω∗ has a dedicated type for
‘finite sequences of objects of type ρ’, namely ρ∗. Since the usual coding of finite
sequences of natural numbers goes through in E-PAω∗, we shall not always distin-
guish between 0 and 0∗. Similarly, we do not always distinguish between ‘sρ’ and
‘〈sρ〉’, where the former is ‘the object s of type ρ’, and the latter is ‘the sequence
of type ρ∗ with only element sρ’. The empty sequence for the type ρ∗ is denoted
by ‘〈〉ρ’, usually with the typing omitted. Furthermore, we denote by ‘|s| = n’
the length of the finite sequence sρ
∗
= 〈sρ0, s
ρ
1, . . . , s
ρ
n−1〉, where |〈〉| = 0, i.e. the
empty sequence has length zero. For sequences sρ
∗
, tρ
∗
, we denote by ‘s ∗ t’ the
concatenation of s and t, i.e. (s ∗ t)(i) = s(i) for i < |s| and (s ∗ t)(j) = t(|s| − j)
for |s| ≤ j < |s|+ |t|. For a sequence sρ
∗
, we define sN := 〈s(0), s(1), . . . , s(N)〉 for
N0 < |s|. For a sequence α0→ρ, we also write αN = 〈α(0), α(1), . . . , α(N)〉 for any
N0. By way of shorthand, qρ ∈ Qρ
∗
abbreviates (∃i < |Q|)(Q(i) =ρ q). Finally, we
shall use x, y, t, . . . as short for tuples xσ00 , . . . x
σk
k of possibly different type σi.
We have used E-PAω and E-PAω∗ interchangeably in this paper. Our motivation
is the ‘star morphism’ used in Robinson’s approach to Nonstandard Analysis, and
the ensuing potential for confusion.
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A.2. The classical system P. In this section, we introduce the system P, a con-
servative extension of E-PAω with fragments of Nelson’s IST.
To this end, we first introduce the base system E-PAω∗st . We use the same defini-
tion as [6, Def. 6.1], where E-PAω∗ is the definitional extension of E-PAω with types
for finite sequences as in [6, §2]. The set T ∗ is defined as the collection of all the
terms in the language of E-PAω∗.
Definition A.3. The system E-PAω∗st is defined as E-PA
ω∗ + T ∗st + IA
st, where T ∗st
consists of the following axiom schemas.
(1) The schema30 st(x) ∧ x = y → st(y),
(2) The schema providing for each closed31 term t ∈ T ∗ the axiom st(t).
(3) The schema st(f) ∧ st(x)→ st(f(x)).
The external induction axiom IAst is as follows.
(IAst) Φ(0) ∧ (∀stn0)(Φ(n)→ Φ(n+ 1))→ (∀stn0)Φ(n).
Secondly, we introduce some essential fragments of IST studied in [6].
Definition A.4. [External axioms of P]
(1) HACint: For any internal formula ϕ, we have
(A.2) (∀stxρ)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y)→
(
∃stF ρ→τ
∗)
(∀stxρ)(∃yτ ∈ F (x))ϕ(x, y),
(2) I: For any internal formula ϕ, we have
(∀stxσ
∗
)(∃yτ )(∀zσ ∈ x)ϕ(z, y)→ (∃yτ )(∀stxσ)ϕ(x, y),
(3) The system P is E-PAω∗st + I+ HACint.
Note that I and HACint are fragments of Nelson’s axioms Idealisation and Stan-
dard part. By definition, F in (A.2) only provides a finite sequence of witnesses to
(∃sty), explaining its name Herbrandized Axiom of Choice.
The system P is connected to E-PAω by the following theorem. Here, the super-
script ‘Sst’ is the syntactic translation defined in [6, Def. 7.1].
Theorem A.5. Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-PAω∗st and suppose
Φ(a)Sst ≡ ∀stx∃sty ϕ(x, y, a). If ∆int is a collection of internal formulas and
(A.3) P+∆int ⊢ Φ(a),
then one can extract from the proof a sequence of closed32 terms t in T ∗ such that
(A.4) E-PAω∗ +∆int ⊢ ∀x∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y, a).
Proof. Immediate by [6, Theorem 7.7]. 
30The language of E-PAω∗st contains a symbol stσ for each finite type σ, but the subscript is
essentially always omitted. Hence T ∗st is an axiom schema and not an axiom.
31A term is called closed in [6] (and in this paper) if all variables are bound via lambda ab-
straction. Thus, if x, y are the only variables occurring in the term t, the term (λx)(λy)t(x, y)
is closed while (λx)t(x, y) is not. The second axiom in Definition A.3 thus expresses that
stτ
(
(λx)(λy)t(x, y)
)
if (λx)(λy)t(x, y) is of type τ . We essentially always omit lambda abstraction
for brevity.
32Recall the definition of closed terms from [6] as sketched in Footnote 31.
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The proofs of the soundness theorems in [6, §5-7] provide an algorithm A to
obtain the term t from the theorem. In particular, these terms can be ‘read off’ from
the nonstandard proofs. The translation Sst can be formalised in any reasonable
33
system of constructive mathematics. In fact, the formalisation of the results in [6]
in the proof assistant Agda (based on Martin-Lo¨f’s constructive type theory [56])
is underway in [94].
In light of the results in [78], the following corollary (which is not present in [6])
is essential to our results. Indeed, the following corollary expresses that we may
obtain effective results as in (A.6) from any theorem of Nonstandard Analysis which
has the same form as in (A.5). It was shown in [77, 78, 81] that the scope of this
corollary includes the Big Five systems of Reverse Mathematics and the associated
‘zoo’ ([37]).
Corollary A.6. If ∆int is a collection of internal formulas and ψ is internal, and
(A.5) P+∆int ⊢ (∀
stx)(∃sty)ψ(x, y, a),
then one can extract from the proof a sequence of closed32 terms t in T ∗ such that
(A.6) E-PAω∗ +∆int ⊢ (∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ψ(x, y, a).
Proof. Clearly, if for internal ψ and Φ(a) ≡ (∀stx)(∃sty)ψ(x, y, a), we have [Φ(a)]Sst ≡
Φ(a), then the corollary follows immediately from the theorem. A tedious but
straightforward verification using the clauses (i)-(v) in [6, Def. 7.1] establishes that
indeed Φ(a)Sst ≡ Φ(a). 
For the rest of this paper, the notion ‘normal form’ shall refer to a formula as in
(A.5), i.e. of the form (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y) for ϕ internal.
Finally, the previous theorems do not really depend on the presence of full Peano
arithmetic. We shall study the following subsystems.
Definition A.7.
(1) Let E-PRAω be the system defined in [55, §2] and let E-PRAω∗ be its defi-
nitional extension with types for finite sequences as in [6, §2].
(2) (QF-ACρ,τ ) For every quantifier-free internal formula ϕ(x, y), we have
(A.7) (∀xρ)(∃yτ )ϕ(x, y)→ (∃F ρ→τ )(∀xρ)ϕ(x, F (x))
(3) The system RCAω0 is E-PRA
ω + QF-AC1,0.
The system RCAω0 is the ‘base theory of higher-order Reverse Mathematics’ as
introduced in [55, §2]. We permit ourselves a slight abuse of notation by also
referring to the system E-PRAω∗ + QF-AC1,0 as RCAω0 .
Corollary A.8. The previous theorem and corollary go through for P and E-PAω∗
replaced by P0 ≡ E-PRA
ω∗ + T ∗st + HACint + I+ QF-AC
1,0 and RCAω0 .
Proof. The proof of [6, Theorem 7.7] goes through for any fragment of E-PAω∗
which includes EFA, sometimes also called I∆0+EXP. In particular, the exponential
function is (all what is) required to ‘easily’ manipulate finite sequences. 
33Here, a ‘reasonable’ system is one which can prove the usual properties of finite lists, for
which the presence of the exponential function suffices.
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A.3. The constructive system H. In this section, we define the system H, the
constructive counterpart of P. The system H was first introduced in [6, §5.2], and
constitutes a conservative extension of Heyting arithmetic E-HAω by [6, Cor. 5.6].
We now study the system H in more detail.
Similar to Definition A.3, we define E-HAω∗st as E-HA
ω∗+T ∗st+IA
st, where E-HAω∗
is just E-PAω∗ without the law of excluded middle. Furthermore, we define
H ≡ E-HAω∗st + HAC+ I+ NCR+ HIP∀st + HGMP
st,
where HAC is HACint without any restriction on the formula, and where the remain-
ing axioms are defined in the following definition.
Definition A.9. [Three axioms of H]
(1) HIP∀st
[(∀stx)φ(x)→ (∃sty)Ψ(y)]→ (∃sty′)[(∀stx)φ(x)→ (∃y ∈ y′)Ψ(y)],
where Ψ(y) is any formula and φ(x) is an internal formula of E-HAω∗.
(2) HGMPst
[(∀stx)φ(x)→ ψ]→ (∃stx′)[(∀x ∈ x′)φ(x)→ ψ]
where φ(x) and ψ are internal formulas in the language of E-HAω∗.
(3) NCR
(∀yτ )(∃stxρ)Φ(x, y)→ (∃stxρ
∗
)(∀yτ )(∃x′ ∈ x)Φ(x′, y),
where Φ is any formula of E-HAω∗
Intuitively speaking, the first two axioms of Definition A.9 allow us to perform
a number of non-constructive operations (namely Markov’s principle and indepen-
dence of premises) on the standard objects of the system H, provided we introduce
a ‘Herbrandisation’ as in the consequent of HAC, i.e. a finite list of possible wit-
nesses rather than one single witness. Furthermore, while H includes idealisation
I, one often uses the latter’s classical contraposition, explaining why NCR is useful
(and even essential) in the context of intuitionistic logic.
Surprisingly, the axioms from Definition A.9 are exactly what is needed to con-
vert nonstandard definitions (of continuity, integrability, convergence, et cetera)
into the normal form (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y) for internal ϕ, as is clear from e.g. Section
5.3. The latter normal form plays an equally important role in the constructive
case as in the classical case by the following theorem.
Theorem A.10. If ∆int is a collection of internal formulas, ϕ is internal, and
(A.8) H+∆int ⊢ ∀
stx∃sty ϕ(x, y, a),
then one can extract from the proof a sequence of closed terms t in T ∗ such that
(A.9) E-HAω∗ +∆int ⊢ ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y, a).
Proof. Immediate by [6, Theorem 5.9]. 
The proofs of the soundness theorems in [6, §5-7] provide an algorithm B to
obtain the term t from the theorem. Finally, we point out one very useful principle
to which we have access.
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Theorem A.11. The systems P,H, and P0 prove overspill, i.e.
(OS) (∀stxρ)ϕ(x)→ (∃yρ)
[
¬st(y) ∧ ϕ(y)
]
,
for any internal formula ϕ.
Proof. See [6, Prop. 3.3]. 
In conclusion, we have introduced the systems H, P, which are conservative
extensions of Peano and Heyting arithmetic with fragments of Nelson’s internal set
theory. We have observed that central to the conservation results (Corollary A.6
and Theorem A.5) is the normal form (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y) for internal ϕ.
Appendix B. Nonstandard Analysis and qualitative information
We list examples of applications of Nonstandard Analysis in which the latter is
explicitly used to model qualitative phenomena.
(1) Raiman ([67, 68]) introduces a formal language FOG for reasoning with
qualitative notions ‘close’, ‘negligible’, and ‘same order of magnitude’. Raiman
proves FOG to be validated in Robinson’s Non-standard Analysis ([72]).
The system FOG has been used in economics and circuit design ([16, 29])
(2) Weld studies the perturbation technique exaggeration in [92] by means of
Nonstandard Analysis. In particular, he uses unlimited and infinitesimal
values to study the limit behaviour for ‘large’ and ‘small’ parameter values.
(3) Davis presents a system based on Nonstandard Analysis for reasoning with
qualitative notions like ‘small’, ‘large’, and ‘medium’. Results in dynamical
systems and differential equations are obtained ([32])
(4) Suenaga et al provide deductive verification framework of signals based on
Nonstandard Analysis in [86]. Rather than using approximations up to
some large finite precision, they use a correct-up-to-infinitesimals approxi-
mation using unlimited precision.
(5) Vopenka ([91]) proposes the use of various nonstandard structures (inside
his alternative set theory AST) to model vague phenomena.
(6) Tzouvaras ([90]) proposes the use of Nonstandard Analysis to model vague
notions like ‘similarity’ and ‘small’.
In light of the previous list, we hope the reader is convinced that Nonstandard
Analysis can be used to model qualitative notions. The usual caveat applies: We
do not claim that this modelling is the best or even accurate; we merely point out
that people have used Nonstandard Analysis for this purpose in practice.
Appendix C. Some theorems relating to term extraction
Theorem C.1. The system P proves that a normal form can be derived from an
implication between normal forms.
Proof. Let ϕ, ψ be internal and consider the following implication between normal
forms:
(C.1) (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y)→ (∀stz)(∃stw)ψ(z, w).
Since standard functionals have standard output for standard input by Definition
A.3, (C.1) implies
(C.2) (∀stζ)
[
(∀stx)ϕ(x, ζ(x)) → (∀stz)(∃stw)ψ(z, w)
]
.
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Bringing all standard quantifiers outside, we obtain the following normal form:
(C.3) (∀stζ, z)(∃stw, x)
[
ϕ(x, ζ(x))→ ψ(z, w)
]
,
as the formula in square brackets is internal. 
It is an interesting exercise to establish the previous theorem for H in the stead
of P.
Theorem C.2. For internal ϕ, the system P proves that (∀ε ≈ 0)(∀stx)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y, ε)
is equivalent to a normal form.
Proof. Written out in full, the initial formula from the theorem is:
(∀ε)
[
(∀stk0)(|ε| < 1
k
)→ (∀stx)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
,
and bringing outside all standard quantifiers as far as possible:
(∀stx)(∀ε)(∃styτ , k0)
[
|ε| < 1
k
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
,
the underlined formula is suitable for Idealisation. Applying the latter yields
(∀stx)(∃stw0
∗
, zτ
∗
)(∀ε)(∃yτ ∈ z, k0 ∈ w)
[
|ε| < 1
k
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
,
and let N0 be the maximum of all w(i) for i < |w|. We obtain:
(C.4) (∀stx)(∃stzτ
∗
, N)(∀ε)(∃yτ ∈ z)
[
|ε| < 1
N
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
.
Clearly, (C.4) implies the initial formula from the theorem. 
Appendix D. Examples in Reverse Mathematics of the computational
content of Nonstandard Analysis
D.1. Theorems equivalent to ACA0. In this section, we study the monotone
convergence theorem MCT, i.e. the statement that every bounded increasing se-
quence of reals is convergent, which is equivalent to arithmetical comprehension
ACA0 by [84, III.2.2]. We prove an equivalence between a nonstandard version of
MCT and a fragment of Transfer. From this nonstandard equivalence, we obtain
an effective RM equivalence involving MCT and arithmetical comprehension.
Firstly, the nonstandard version of MCT (involving nonstandard convergence) is:
(MCTns) (∀
stc0→1(·) )
[
(∀n0)(cn ≤ cn+1 ≤ 1)→ (∀N,M ∈ Ω)[cM ≈ cN ]
]
,
where ‘(∀K ∈ Ω)(. . . )’ is short for (∀K0))(¬st(K) → . . . ). The effective version
MCTef(t):
(D.1) (∀c0→1(·) , k
0)
[
(∀n0)(cn ≤ cn+1 ≤ 1)→ (∀N,M ≥ t(c(·))(k))[|cM − cN | ≤
1
k
]
]
.
We require two equivalent ([55, Prop. 3.9]) versions of arithmetical comprehension:
(µ2) (∃µ2)
[
(∀f1)((∃n)f(n) = 0→ f(µ(f)) = 0)
]
,
(∃2) (∃ϕ2)
[
(∀f1)((∃n)f(n) = 0↔ ϕ(f) = 0)
]
,
Clearly, (∃2) (and therefore (µ2)) is the functional version of ACA0. We also recall
the restriction of Nelson’s axiom Transfer as follows:
(Π01-TRANS) (∀
stf1)
[
(∀stn0)f(n) 6= 0→ (∀m)f(m) 6= 0
]
.
Denote by MU(µ) the formula in square brackets in (µ2). We have the following
theorem which establishes the explicit equivalence between (µ2) and uniform MCT.
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Theorem D.1. We have P ⊢ MCTns ↔ Π
0
1-TRANS. From this proof, terms s, u
can be extracted such that E-PAω∗ proves:
(D.2) (∀µ2)
[
MU(µ)→ MCTef(s(µ))
]
∧ (∀t1→1)
[
MCTef(t)→ MU(u(t))
]
.
Proof. See [78, §4.1]. 
We point out (D.2) is the ‘effective’ version of the equivalence ACA0 ↔ MCT; the
former is obtained from the corresponding ‘nonstandard’ equivalence Π01-TRANS↔
MCTns. Note that the latter proof proceeds by contradiction.
Finally, while we did not emphasise this in Section 2, Reverse Mathematics
usually studies mathematical theorems formalised in second-order arithmetic. The
latter only involves natural numbers and sets thereof, i.e. continuous functions on
the real numbers are indirectly present in the form of codes (See [83, §4]). Now,
(D.2) is clearly not part of second-order arithmetic (as it involves objects of type
two), but it is possible to obtain results in second-order arithmetic from (D.2), as
explored in [80].
D.2. Theorems equivalent to ATR0 and Π
1
1-CA0. In this section, we study
equivalences relating to ATR0 and Π
1
1-CA0, the strongest Big Five systems. We
shall work with the Suslin functional (S2), the functional version of Π11-CA0.
(S2) (∃S2)(∀f1)
[
S(f) =0 0↔ (∃g
1)(∀x0)(f(gx) 6= 0)
]
.
Feferman has introduced the following version of the Suslin functional (See e.g. [2]).
(µ1) (∃µ
1→1
1 )
[
(∀f1)
(
(∃g1)(∀x0)(f(gx) 6= 0)→ (∀x0)(f(µ1(f)x) 6= 0)
)]
,
where the formula in square brackets is MUO(µ1). We require another instance of
Transfer :
(Π11-TRANS) (∀f
1)
[
(∃g1)(∀x0)(f(gx) 6= 0)→ (∃stg1)(∀stx0)(f(gx) 6= 0)
]
.
We first consider PST, i.e. the statement that every tree with uncountably many
paths has a non-empty perfect subtree. As proved in [84, V.5.5], we have PST ↔
ATR0 and a uniform version of PST is equivalent to the Suslin functional by [76,
Theorem 4.4]. Now, PST has the following nonstandard and uniform versions.
Theorem D.2 (PSTns). For all standard trees T
1, there is standard P 1 such that
(∀f0→1(·) )(∃f ∈ T )(∀n)(fn 6=1 f)→ P is a non-empty perfect subtree of T .
Theorem D.3 (PSTef(t)). For all trees T
1, we have
(∀f0→1(·) )(∃f ∈ T )(∀n)(fn 6=1 f)→ t(T ) is a non-empty perfect subtree of T .
As a technicality, we require that P as in the previous two principles consists of
a pair (P ′, p′) such that P ′ is a perfect subtree of T such that p′ ∈ P ′.
Theorem D.4. We have P ⊢ PSTns ↔ Π
1
1-TRANS. From the latter, terms s, u
can be extracted such that E-PAω∗ proves:
(D.3) (∀µ1)
[
MUO(µ1)→ PSTef(s(µ1))
]
∧ (∀t1→1)
[
PSTef(t)→ MUO(u(t))
]
.
Proof. See [78, §4.5]. 
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In conclusion, (D.3) is the ‘effective’ version of [76, Theorem 4.4]; the former is
obtained from the corresponding ‘nonstandard’ equivalence Π11-TRANS ↔ PSTns.
Note that the latter proof proceeds by contradiction.
Another more mathematical statement which can be treated along the same lines
is every countable Abelian group is a direct sum of a divisible and a reduced group.
The latter is called DIV and equivalent to Π11-CA0 by [84, VI.4.1]. By the proof
of the latter, the reverse implication is straightforward; We shall therefore study
DIV→ Π11-CA0.
To this end, let DIV(G,D,E) be the statement that the countable Abelian group
G satisfies G = D ⊕ E, where D is a divisible group and E a reduced group. The
nonstandard version of DIV is as follows:
(DIVns) (∀
stG)(∃stD, d,E)
[
DIV(G,D,E) ∧ (D 6= {0G} → d ∈ D)
]
,
where we used the same technicality as for PSTns. The effective version is:
(DIVef(t))
(∀G)
[
DIV(G, t(G)(1), t(G)(2)) ∧ (t(G)(1) 6= {0G} → t(G)(3) ∈ t(G)(1))
]
.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem D.5. We have have P ⊢ DIVns → Π
1
1-TRANS. From the latter, a term
u can be extracted such that E-PAω∗ proves:
(D.4) (∀t1→1)
[
DIVef(t)→ MUO(u(t))
]
.
Proof. See [77, §4.5]. 
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